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1.0. Introduction and Objectives
Oil is now being explored in many parts of Namibia both 
onshore and offshore. The discovery of the gas field known as 
"Kudu Gas Field” along the southern coastal line of Namibia 
and high expectation of oil onshore in Etosha and Nama basins 
are main focus of this dissertation. Whereas the threat of 
oil spill along the Namibian coast was never investigated or 
recorded and crude oil never being handled or transported 
along the Namibian coast, the government should aware of the 
environmental impacts of exploitation and production of those 
resources. What one needs to be aware of are the problems to 
be caused by marine oil spill. These problems may vary in 
degrees. The obvious ones are those of containment, recovery, 
clean-up disposal, jurisdiction and responsibilities for 
environmental restoration.
Marine pollution may not only threaten the marine 
environment and its resources but also other resources 
onshore and other places such as port facilities are to be 
affected as well. Pollution is not only a problem for experts 
and scienticities as it has been some years ago. The World 
Conference on Environment and Development, " Earth Summit", 
held in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro in Brazil proves this 
statement. Today pollution is being tackled at high political 
levels. The attendance of powerful delegations including the 
heads of states and other high ranging officials at this 
summit shows the seriousness about pollution problems world 
wide .
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Oil pollution of the marine environment which is the 
concern in this paper is part and parcel of the global 
pollution threatening the world today. Like other pollutants, 
oil pollution does not recognize the artificial or political 
boundaries. Oil pollution gets into the marine environment 
through two major different ways, such as deliberate 
discharge of oil waste and other oil particulars into the sea 
and accidental spillage. The first category has been delt 
with considerably at national and international levels. But 
still a lot of efforts are required to accomplish it. The 
major problem lies with the latter, which arises as a result 
of ship coalition, grounding, wrecking and so on.
Marine accidents occur from time to time world wide.
The worst examples of such accidents are the Torrey Cannyon 
in 1967, Argo Merchant in 1976, Amoco Cadiz in 1978 the Exxon 
Valdez in 1989 and the fire on board of the Agip Abrozzo (the 
V.L.C.C.) carrying 130 000 tonnes of oil along the Italian 
coast in April 1991. The recent example of that nature is the 
incident involving an oil tanker (the Katina P.) along the 
Mozambican coast in April 1992. It was reported that the 
Mozambican government was "facing an environmental disaster 
and appealed for international help after a 66 000 tonnes 
capacity oil tanker went aground 20km. north of Inhaca Island 
near Maputo. Furthermore, the Mozambican Foreign Minister who 
appeal for international help was quoted saying "everything 
now depends on the time and weather"
Following his request for international assistance in 
both judicial and technical matters the British experts were 
reported to have brought about 40 tonnes of oil pollution 
equipment meanwhile 160 tonnes of similar equipment was sent 
to Maputo by road and sea from Cape Town, South Africa. 
According to Mr. Jan Lud (Adviser of the Norwegian Maritime 
Inspection Department), the Mozambican authority was not 
prepared for any incident of that nature. The amount of oil
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leaked from that particular tanker was estimated at about 500 
tonnes from which 300 tonnes went ashore. The clean-up 
operation which was supervised by the Internal Tanker Owners 
Association involved up to 1000 local labourers."^
Now the question is. Does Namibia need to wait or to 
experience a similar situation in order to establish herself 
in a better position ? It is upon the above ground the author 
based his augment and tried to find out what Namibia could do 
to avoid such a possible situation occurring in Namibia by 
mobilizing and developing her resources either unilaterally 
or bi-laterally within the concepts of oil contingency 
planning and emergence response.
This dissertation is focusing on the issues of oil 
pollution in the marine environment resulting from both' 
accidents and operational of ships, platforms, oil terminals, 
at ports and other places in Namibia as' the case might be. It 
aims at the implementation of the Prevention and Combating Of 
Pollution Of The Sea By Oil Act, 1991.
The paper briefly explores the oil situation in Namibia ^ 
before and after independence and its future perspective in 
relation to the marine environment protection. This has been 
done with the purpose of establishing the facts that led to 
the setting up of na'tional institutions to deal with oil 
spill at national and local levels. The necessary statements 
for each chapter or section is given at the beginning of the 
section concerned.
The paper is divided into six parts five chapters and 
appendixes and bibiography at the end. The first chapter 
(Chapter 1) deals with the general information including the 
introduction, objectives and the brief description of 
Namibia's marine environment and it's resources. This chapter 
lays the foundation of others to follow.
The second chapter (Chapter 2) covers general aspects of 
oil pollution. It elaborates further, the types of oil, its
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sources, behavior into waters in case of spill and the 
international efforts on controlling marine oil pollution.
The chapter gives the readers a broad knowledge of oil 
pollution and its related matters.
The third chapter (Chapter 3> deals with the>Namibian * 
situation in depth. It explains the activities related to oil 
exploration, marine pollution prevention and regulatory 
measures taken before and after independence with 
specific references to oil pollution.
The fourth chapter (chapter 4) covers the proposals put 
forward by the author on the subject matter. This is the main 
part of the dissertation whereby all the experiences learned 
from previous charter are brought together and new ideas are 
being developed. The chapter is sub~divided further into two 
parts namely, part A and B. Part A is being dedicated to 
preventive measures while part B is dedicated to emergency 
response.
The fifth part (Chapter 5) of the project deals with 
conclusions and recommendations on the above discussions. 
Readers are being advised to read this chapter for 
comprehensive ideas on the subject.
At the end are appendixes, references and bibiography. 
Readers are being adviced to read the paper in a 
chronological order of the chapters as all are inter related 
to each other. No chapter should be read in isolation from 
the other as they keep referring to one another all the way 
through.
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1.2. Namibia In Brief
As mentioned on page 4 above, the chapter in general, 
and this section in particular lays the basis for the 
dissertation. The section provides a brief description of the 
country's history and those of other sectors of its economy. 
All the of these are directly or indirectly related to 
pollution in general and that of the marine environment 
in particular. Upon such information historical event has 
been traced and conclusion has been drawn.
Namibia is a country of 2489 square km. with a 
population of 1.4 million people.*^’ It is located in the south 
western part of Africa. The country was under foreign 
administrations and domination for more than hundred years 
but at last attained its independence on 21st March 1990.
The country was a German colony from 1884 to 1915. Following 
the Germans defeat by the South African forces, in 1915 the i
territory felt under the South African military rule to 1920 
when it v/as placed under a Mandate System by the League of 
Nations. After the German relinquished their claim to Namibia 
in 1919 the South West African Mandate, as the country was 
called, was conferred on His Brittanic Majesty the King of 
Great Britain in 1920, who in turn handed the mandate to 
South Africa to exercise it on his behalf."-^
From that date onwards the South African authority tried 
to annex the territory to the Republic of South Africa. The 
move was countered by the international community, the League 
of Nations by then. In 1967 South Africa (S.A.) was declared 
illegal in Namibia by the United Nations and the territory 
was renamed Namibia after the Namib desert which saved the 
territory from early foreign intruders.®
From 1967 Namibia was legally presumed to be 
administered by the United Nations Council for Namibia which 
was established the same year. Much could not be achieved by
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the council as S.A. could not let the council administer the 
territory from its boundary. In 1989 S.A. agreed to the 
implementation of the United Nation Resolution 435 calling 
for UN. supervised elections in Namibia, which led to the 
establishment of an independent Namibian government in 1990.
(A) Economic Background
Namibia is rich in both minerals, agricultural and 
fisheries resources. All these resources had been subjected 
to foreign exploitation, which resulted in over exploitation 
of fisheries and neglegence of other sectors of economy, such 
as crop production and subsistence agricultural farming. 
Namibia's economy was dominated by onshofe mining throughout 
the colonial periods. There are more than 50 and other 
precious stones scattered all over the country and about 40 
mines in operation.*^
Currently all mineral rights are vested in the state , 
but exploration and mining are exclusively undertaken by the 
private sector. The mining consequences on the environmental 
and ecological system have been questionable all those years. 
A study by the United Nations Institute for Namibia the then 
Lusaka based institute from 1976 to 1991 cautioned them about 
the environmental impact of diamond mining activities along 
the coast whereby sands are removed from one place to another 
The managing Director of three major fishing companies at 
Luderitz criticized the diamond mining techniques used around 
Luderitz for the declining in the lobster industry. Such a 
method has been employed since the late 50's and no studies 
on the environmental impacts has been carried out all the 
years. No environmental threats have been indicated from 
the agricultural sector as there are no extensive 
agricultural activities along the coast due to its nature 
which is a desert region and no crop farming along the rivers
7
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with extensive uses of fertilizers.
(B) Coastal Line And Sea Ports
The coast of Namibia runs in an almost straight line for 
about 135 km. in direction NNW—SSE. It runs in north west 
direction 24 to 40 degrees (Hollas Bird Island) and 16 to 20 
degrees (Cape Frio) But at 16 degrees it diffects north and 
then north—North—eastwards into Angola.See the attached 
map (la), before this chapter. Much of the Namibian coast is 
characterized by the narrow belt of low-lying land dunes of 
the desert.
Much of the sea bottom is featureless, consisting of a 
wide shelves bounded by the 300 km. isobeth, which extends 
some 90 to 100 km. off the shore between Cape Cross (21 to 50 
degrees). In the Northern area, a sharp increase in depth , 
occurs to the west of the Cape Frio where the Walvis Ridge 
joins the African continent. From there onwards, the shelf 
slopes steeply from 300 m, to 300 over a short distance of 50 
km. A less pronounced increase in depth also occurs to the 
west of Hollams Bird Island. The isobeths therefore run 
parallel to the coastline over much of the region, except 
between 19 and 16 degrees where they become deflected inshore 
associated with the sharp depth changes.^®
The Namibian coast and the sea board eastwards 
experienced a strong developed bi-directional wind regime' 
with predominating winds blowing seasonally from opposing 
quarters. The summer dry season is the windiest season of the 
year particularly in December and January "with an average 
wind of a velocity of 24 km. per hour".=^^ The strongest 
onshore wind on the west coast occur at the hottest and 
driest time of the day, particularly in summer when the 
pressure gradients are strong, providing optional dune 
forming conditions.^™
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Sea ports (Namibian Ports)
The only natural harbours on the Namibian coast are at 
Walvis Bay and Luderitz. Other bays like the Swakopmund and 
Moeve Bay in the north about 400 km. from Outdo may offer 
little natural protection advantages but could be considered 
for future use if the need arises.
(i> Walvis Bay
The port of Walvis Bay which is located approximately in 
the middle of Namibia's coastal line, due west of Windhoek is 
the only deep seaport for Namibia. The harbour is formed by a 
low lying sand peninsula leading to a pelican point at the 
entrance to the bay. The harbour is approximately nine 
kilometers wide at the entrance and 12 kilometers long.-^"^
The south half of the harbour is a very shallow lagoon. The 
water depth at the entrance to the harbour is twenty meters 
and the approaches to the port are maintained through dredged 
channels. Commercial whalves at the port seems to be well 
protected by the natural harbour but there might be a danger 
to fishing whalves at the north-east of the commercial 
whalves. Due to the fact that they are exposed to the danger 
of swell, small break waters have been constructed to protect 
some of these whalves from sea swells.^®
The port can handle both mini — and full size containers 
and has cranes for handling loose freight. It handles about 
900 vessels and 740 000 tonnes of cargo per year. The dolphin 
type tanker jetty can take vessels with a length between 
128-129 m. with 20 - 30 000 cargo capacity. Fuel is pumped 
into a large storage tank at the port.^*^
The status of Walvis Bay is unclear due to the colonial 
history of the country. At the moment the port is under South- 
African Authority. South Africa claims the ownership to the
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enclave and other 12 islands (the Penguins Islands) all in 
all totals 112 square kilometers. Apart from her claim over 
the port and enclave surrounding areas and the above referred 
islands, she claims for 200 nautical miles fishing zones in 
the waters extending from Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, 
which constitutes about 14% of the Namibian offshore waters 
within the 200 miles limits (EEZ) See Figures 1, 5.1 and
5.2 on the claimed EEZ and port lay out respectively.
In order to avoid confusion and misunderstandings, 
readers are being advised to view Walvis Bay as an integral 
part of Namibia as it has been clearly stipulated in the 
Namibian constitution. Article 1 (4) and the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 432 of 1978.
<ii> Luderitz
The port of Luderitz is located 400 kilometers south of 
the Walvis Bay and 250 kilometers north of the southern • 
boarder of Namibia. The coastal line in this area is 
described as "general rocky, with low hills leading straight 
down to the sea" Several islands which are being claimed
by the South African Authorities viz. the Seal Island,
Penguin Island and Halifax Island are within the ares of 
Luderitz. These are the islands which supports the breeding 
colonies of both sea birds and seals along the Namibian 
coast.
Unlike the port of Walvis Bay, the commercial harbour 
and the jetty at Luderitz are fairly protected from the swell 
by the Shark Island. See figures 5.3 and 5.4 in the 
appendixes section for detailed information on the location 
of the port. Although the port is fairly protected "heavy 
swells from the Northern-western can cause problems to 
vessels mooring at the jetty" The mooring length at the
harbour is about 220 m. and the water depth at the anchorage 
in the Luderitz harbour (between Angra Point and the Shark
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Island) is about 7.5 m. The depth within Mania Creek is less 
than 3m. so a dredged channel has been formed to provide for 
access to the jetty. This dredged channel is about 6.1 m. 
even though some siltation has been experienced for some 
time
The port area is fairly confined, being bounded by the 
road and town. An area of about 4000 square meters is 
available at the head of the jetty. The above referred space 
is being used for rail sidings. There are two small oil tanks 
at the port and another one which is connected to the jetty 
by a 4-5 inch pipeline. The total oil storage capacity is 
about 1,600 cubic
(ii} Swakopmund
Apart from the Walvis Bay and the Luderitz ports, the 
port of Swakopmund has been suggested as another alternative 
to Walvis Bay. The Swakopmund port was used during the 
Germans colonial period in Namibia. Big vessels were using 
lighters one for that purpose. It seems the port has some 
disadvantages to the sea going vessels. It too exposed to the 
sea and lacks a holding anchorage such as the one at Walvis 
Bay.
<D) Shipping and Sea Transport
Shipping never being administered in Namibia. All 
maritime activities were administered by and are still 
controlled from South Africa. No doubt the administration of 
such field by or though foreign administration South Africa 
in this case has a major impact to the integrity and law 
enforcement. The status of Walvis Bay, have great impact to 
the enforcement of Namibian oil pollution laws.
Walvis Bay, the only deep sea port, handles about 98% of
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all seaborne traffic in Namibia. Its capacity, which was 
referred to on page 10 above, was estimated to have consisted 
of about 750 000 tonnes of petroleum products in 1980.®^ The 
port is served by the Southern African and European Container 
Service (SAECS) a consortium of South African and West 
European shipping line on a regular liner basis. Liner 
container services between Walvis Bay, Luderitz and the South 
African ports are being provided by the UNICORN Liner 
container service. Other services are in the form of coastal 
tramping (charter) operations between the Namibian ports 
themselves and Namibia and South African ports. The port of 
Luderitz is being operated by the Trans Namib Ltd. (T.N.L.), 
a Company which can provide all maritime services at the port 
and lights along the coastal line with an exception of Walvis 
Bay
Apart from the newly created fishing companies with few 
fishing boats, there is no Namibian shipping company in 
existence today. The number of fishing vessels in the 
Namibian waters is increasing. The establishment of Namibian 
fishing companies and the presence of contracted foreign 
fishing boats led to such an increase. During the first week 
of January 1992 alone, the Port Captain of Walvis Bay 
indicated that there were about 30 fishing boats anchored at 
Walvis Bay. Therefore, the possibilities of oil pollution 
from fishing vessels could not be ruled out as some of them 
are large enough to generate oil spills during their 
operations and other related functions. Cargo vessels and oil 
exploration currently under way may pose threat to the marine 
environment. Although there is no oil pollution has been 
reported along the coast, the possibilities for oil pollution 
from the vessels and other ports' activities such as small 
ship yard and container terminals at the port of Walvis Bay 
for example could not be ruled out.
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(C> Sea Resources
(i) Fisheries
The Namibian sea has been described as having an 
exceptional high biological productivity because of the 
upwelling of nutrients resulting from the Benguela Current, 
which flows northwards along the coast. The estimation is 
that if proper management of the Benguela species is done, 
its production could amount up to 3 million tonnes per year 
and half of this resource is expected to occur in Namibian 
waters. As with other coastal upwelling system, the Benguela 
current is dominated by fish species which can utilize the 
rich plankton production in the upper water layers.'""®
The fisheries sector in Namibia is divided into two 
industries
- the inshore pelagic fisheries using the Namibian based 
purse-seine net fleets, and
- an offshore demeshal (bottom) fishery previously conducted 
by foreigner trawl fleets and now conducted by
state owned fleets.
The offshore fishery was dominated by the ex-Soviet 
Union, other former East European Countries and Spanish ships 
which caught hakes, sole, snoek (horse mackerel) and a 
variety of other pelagic (surface) and demetal fish. These 
fleets froz the catch on board and returned back to their 
home countries for processing. The stock of hake has suffered 
a great deal from over exploitation over the years. It is 
being estimated to be at one third of its former level.
Horse Mackerel has become the main target for the state owned 
fleets nowadays.
The inshore fisheries which include pilchard, anchovy, 
maasbanker (Sardine) and rock lobster or clay fish was 
dominated by the South Africans at the ports of Walvis Bay 
and Luder itzThe two ports provide proper fishing
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harbours as well. There are no other places around the coast 
whereby fishing is permanently undertaken or combined with 
other agricultural activities as the coast is semi-desert 
along its entire length. Walvis Bay is the main fishing 
harbour where most fish processing industries and services 
facilities are also located. It serves all the need of 
locally based fishing fleets operating in that area. The 
fishing harbour at Luderitz served mainly as rock loberster 
fisheries but the establishment of the Pescanova factory at 
Luderitz in 1991, which processes white fish, may change the 
trend .
<ii) Seals and Sea Birds
Seals and seabirds are abundant in the inshore area of
the Namibian sea, especially al 
seal reserve is to be found nor 
Cape Cross area. The sealing co 
for more than two hundred years 
which the culling v/as conducted 
Namibian waters has been expand 
decades. The number of seals at 
was estimated at about 90 000 i 
century, yearing seal pups were 
production of up to 55 000 pelt 
bulls has been also killed for 
The population of the bird 
producing quano on the man-made 
and the Cape Cross for over a c 
these birds depended on pelagic 
at the bird colony is being cul 
with a harvest of 4000 to 5000
ong the southern coast.A 
th of the Henties Bay in the 
lony has been culled for pelts 
. Despite the cruel manner in 
, the number of seals in the 
ed over the last three 
the Cape Cross Seal Colony 
n 1991-2.-“'^ In the 20th 
regularly exploited with a 
s per annum. Small numbers of 
their skins.
colonies, which had been 
platforms between Walvis Bay 
entury, have been reduced as 
fish stock. The quano harvest 
tivated annually or biannually 
tonnes per year
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( iii). Sea Weed
Sea weed is one of the marketable marine resources in 
Namibia. Currently the sea weed harvest is very low and the 
manner in which it takes place could be considered to be 
harmless to the marine environment because it is swept up 
onto the shore and then collected for industrial purposes.
(D). Oil and Gas
The Namibian petroleum prospecting history started only 
in the 1960's and 1970's when a number of foreign companies 
were leased for the purpose. The first onshore prospecting 
Grant was awarded to the Etosha Petroleum Company in 1959 to 
explore an area of 248 400 000 hectors ranging from the 
Atlantic Ocean to Namibian borders with Angola, Botswana and 
Zambia. The exploration was hampered by the political 
situation which has surround the country for all those years. 
On this ground the Etosha Company was forced to withdraw from 
the offer and the contract was leased to the Taiwan Overseas 
Petroleum Investment Corporation (TOPIC
Sporadic exploration for gas was done some years ago.
"In the early seventies, the United States company Chevron 
discovered the Kudu offshore gas field. The discovery was 
made approximately 120 kilometers off the mouth of river 
Orange, which forms Namibia's southern border with S.A. 
and just 2.8 km. inside Namibian territorial waters . In 
1973 the Kudu 9A-1 v/ell was drilled and capped in 1974 then 
Chevron left the area. No reason given to its withdrawal 
however, it seems to be that political pressure was put this 
company to withdraw. Its withdrawal coincided with the 
adoption of Decree Number One for the protection of the 
territory's natural resources by the UN Council for 
Namibia on 27 September 1974."-'^'^
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A United Nations Mandate in 1976 voided all concessions 
granted to foreign companies by the South African government. 
This resulted in a ten - year period without further oil 
exploration till 1987 and 1988 when two more wells were 
drilled for the South West Africa Oil Company (SWAKOF) 
superseded by NAMCOR. The offshore area out to the 1000 m. 
and the isobeth is about 240 square kilometers. The offshore 
blocks fall into four main areas
- the Namibe Basin to the north of Walvis Bay ridge 
bordering Angola,
- the Walvis and Luderitz Basins in the middle and
- the Orange Basin shared with S.A. They are clearly 
indicated in Figure No 2 in the appendixes.
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2.0 Oil As Source Of Marine Pollution
Not only that Namibia was the last colony in the world 
history. But the country had been subjected to a system which 
resulted in physical abuse of its resources including those 
of the marine environment. Namibians had been denied their 
right to education especially in the field of science and 
mathematics and systemah ical ly cut off froia the entire world 
for not allowed to participate in international fora.^
This chapter seeks to provide basic scientific 
information on oil pollution and efforts by the international 
organizations such as the IMO in dealing with oil pollution. 
These will serve as basis for the formulation and 
implementation of national oil contingency plan.
The danger of marine pollution from oil activities being 
out in Namibia and the none-ratification of international 
conventions by Namibia are the main focus of this chapter.
The latter receive more attention from this section. 
Sub-sections 2.4 of this chapter, 3.1.2 and 3.2.3 of chapter 
three pay more attention to this problem. The general 
information given under 2.4 are of more important to law 
makers and oil contingency planners. The tv/o groups are the 
key players in national oil contingency planning. The 
sub-section covered major aspects which need to be considered 
during the preparation of contingency plan.
16
2.1 SOURCES
Not all amount of oil entering the sea is harmful to the 
marine environment. The impacts of oil from natural seeps for 
example may not pose any threat to he marine environment.
The presence of this oil in the marine environment could be 
in the dissolved or adsorbed form therefore, no visible 
impact on the water surface. This does not imply that 
physical appearance of oil above the waters has strong impact 
to the marine environment. The impact of oil pollution on the 
marine environment is determined by different factors as 
provided in sub-sections 2.2.0 and 2.30 bellow.
It is the human interventions in the sea which lend to 
the degradation of the marine environment. The 
transportation of crude oil has drastically increased the 
amount of oil entering the sea today. The chemicals and other 
toxic introduced to oil products during productions and 
refineries are the major threats to the marine resources.
Even though the release of crude oil in to the marine sea 
have a visible impact, its biological effects to the marine 
environment is lower than that of refined products.^"
2.1.1 Spillage From Ships
Both tanker, general cargo ships and fishing boats can 
cause pollution to the marine environment. Oil spill from 
ships can be divided into two categories namely, operational 
and accidental. According to IMO operational pollution from 
ships constitutes the majority of oil pollution from ships. 
Oil tankers are the main sources of this type of pollution as 
they discharge ballast waters and oil resides from their 
cargo tanks. In the paper presented by Mr. Sasamura, an 
consultant) to the Law of The Sea. Conference in 
Malmo, Sweden spills from ships machinery rooms was listed
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number four i.e. it was second to tanker accidents in 1990 
which shows the danger of such a source to the marine 
environment. This oil is usual purposely discharged or 
resulted from non working oil monitoring equipment.
Tanker accidents occurs in case fire, collision,
stc. Tanker accidents often cause very severe 
damage to the local marine environment. This damage depends 
mainly on the size of a particular tanker and the nature of 
oil involved. It should be understood that some accidents 
are preventable while others are not. The preventive methods 
may include education and training and other regulative 
measures v/hich could be achieved in both short and long run.
2.1.2 Spillage From Oil Drilling At Sea
Offshore oil operation may cause contihUQUsly spills iii 
few amount results from the separation of water from the 
recovered oil, disposal of drilled mud and even after 
cleaning of equipment. But oil well blow-out may result in a 
tremendous oil spill of a catastrophic nature. In its 
publication "OUR ASSIGNMENT" the Norwegian Oil Control State 
Department a blow-out of a production plat form may result in 
a discharge of more than 20 000 tonnes of oil per day.'”’
Reservoir water from the offshore platforms which is 
produced with oil contains dissolved oil components might be 
discharged at sea as well and cause further damage to the 
environment. Experience from the North Sea has shown that the 
amount of produced water increases during the life time of 
the oil field and the total of oil discharged into the sea 
peaks as production continues. The total discharoes of oil 
from offshore oil and gas operation in the North Sea peaked 
from 1981 to 1985 and still is expected to peak around the 
mid 1990 s. •• An increases or decreases of such a spill 
depends on the levels of production and drilling activities.
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While oil drilling pollution is among the least types of 
sources of marine environment, its potential danger to the 
marine environment is very high. As the amount of oil being 
released into the sea from drilling operation can increase 
during the life span of the drilling plant, Namibia should 
prepare to meet such a challenge in carrying out its offshore 
drilling operation. The absence of a global legal regime on 
this field is a major disadvantage for the Namibian 
regulatory authorities. Efforts had been initiated for 
international conventions but never being materialized. The 
Convention for Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Resulting from Exploration for and Exp-loi tat ion of Sea bed 
Minerals, London 1977 was one the above referred instruments. 
Instead, countries entered in bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
cooperations for mutual assistance. It is therefore essential 
for Namibia to be fully prepared about this crucial issue.
2.1.3. Spills from Damaged or Corroded Sea Bed Pipeline
No safe havens in all activities to which human beings 
are involved. Wherever oil pipelines are, there is a 
possibility of oil spills. Pipe lines at sea are exposed to 
dangers of one kind or the other. Blow-out and Pipe ruptures
at sea are some of the Gs.uses of such problems but corroded 
pipeline is eminent in this field therefore, who ever might 
be involved in such activities should have an emergence 
contingency plan.
This can involve any kind of oil from platforms to shore 
and or fuel from refineries, piping systems for bunkering and 
so on. Handling of oil at ports and terfflinals fOhSt 1 fctttb’S a 
great danger of such type of oil spill.
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2.2.0. Fate and Effects of Oil On Marine Environment
The sight of oil on the water is visual and common to 
all people. Crude oil and petroleum distillate products 
introduced to the marine environment are immediately subject 
to a variety of physical and chemical as well as biological 
changes. The behavior of a large crude oil slick at sea is 
more difficult to understand at first. It has been observed 
that the moment “crude oil touches the water part of its 
higher components spreads out very rapidly and produces a 
flash slick which may cover a substantial area’’.''-^ But 
heavier components of the same spill spread out more slowly 
and are more difficult to fall apart without pressure of 
strong wind and waves. Strong winds and waves may break the 
slick into small droplets and start to be dissolved into the 
sea. The most important factor in the weathering process f
during the first 48 hours of the spills is evaporation.
During this process, "low to medium weight crude oil 
components with low boiling points volatilised into the 
atmosphere".^
Light oil such as fuel oil, gasoline etc. evaporate at a 
rate which depends on weather -conditions but all could 
disappear within 12 to 24 hours after the spill takes place."'' 
The main components of the oil may partially dissolved into 
the sea but as they tend to be toxic, they may have adverse 
effects on plankton or fish in the affected area. Some 
component of light oil components are toxic to various marine 
organisms and their impacts on the marine environment is 
greater than those of the crude or heavy oil.
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2.2.1. Oil Effects On Marine Resources
As mentioned above, oil spill has different impacts to 
different marine resources. An impact assessment of an oil 
spill depends on the location, amount of the spill and the 
affected resources.*'®
On living resources, fish species and sea birds seem to 
be vulnerable than seals to any oil spill into the marine 
environment. Oil spill could cause death to fish, contaminate 
some by accumulating oil droplets and reduce their 
productivities. Sea birds are directly or indirectly affected 
by oil spill. Young ones are mostly affected than the older 
ones. It is self evident that floating oil slicks cause 
losses of bird, but the level of mortalities depends also 
upon the location of spill and the seasons. Even if the spill 
is so small it may kill many bird especially the younger 
ones. Tanker accidents are major threats to sea birds as 
birds are sensitive te ahy bil
circumstances, even when small amount of oil have been 
spilled, may cause mass mortalities.
The effects of oil spill to the marine environment 
differ from one another, different organisms at different 
places react differently to oil pollution. Individual within 
a species may differ, eggs, lalvae, and newly molted 
individuals may have different sensitivities to the same 
level of pollution. See the summaries in the appendixes, 
tables 50.5 and 50.6 on the effects of oil in some major 
ecosystems and the proposed environmental classification in 
order of increasing vulnerability to oil spill damage, 
respectively.
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2.3.0 Factors That Determine The Severity Of The 
Ecological Impact
The effect that an oil spill may have on marine life may 
vary from one spill to the other as contributory factors 
referred above differ as well. Factors below are considered 
to be the major determinants of the biological damage of an 
oil spill to the marine environment. Summaries of effects of
oil in some major ecosystems and the proposed environmental 
claesifieation in order of inereaging vulnerability to oil
damage are being provided in tables 50.5 and 50.6 
respectively. See the above referred tables in the appendiK:
2.3.1 Dosage and Types Of Oil
f
The size of spill at a certain area is primarily 
determined by the quantity of oil spilt. Although crude oil 
has less effect to the marine enyironment, in comparable to 
that of refined products, its effects lasts longer than that 
of light and refined products.”^ Crude oil consists a mixture 
of vast number of individual organic chemicals which vary in 
nature. Generally the ehemicalg of crude oil are in tv/o 
types, the lighter ones which considered to be quite toxic 
and heavy resides which are comparatively inert. The large 
•the spill the more effects it has to the environment.
2.3.2 Duration Of EIxposure
The longer the spill exposed to the weather the less 
toxic or harmful they are to the marine environment.
Scientific research has shown that, A large crude oil spill 
exposed to open sea weather for more than 24 hours for 
example, may have less effect to the marine environment
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simple because the lighter oil and more soluble compounds 
which are toxic, are removed and degraded early in the 
weathering process. Such a spill may have less biological 
impact to the environment.^-^
2.3.3. Location and Natural Environmental Stress
The climatic conditions and the location of a spill have 
influence to the ecological impacts by both crude and light 
oil spills.The two factors are directly linked to 2.3.2. 
above. One may imagine spill which involves crude or heavy 
oil in the high seas and along the coastal line and asses 
their impacts. The effect of oil spill in the cold 
environment might be much more serious and lasting than that 
in the more temperate areas. The location is also important , 
in terms of the physical or physiographic energy of the area. 
A spill which takes place at the low energy marshy area and 
other sensitive areas seems to have more impact to the marine 
environment than the one on high energy rocky coastline.
No doubt that oceanographic and•meteorological factors 
such as wind conditions and currents in the spill have direct 
impact to a particular spill. A combination of heavy wind and 
currents' action may break the spill into small droplets and 
spread it around the large area which may reduce it's &evef-e 
impact to the marine environment.^-® But the negative impact 
of these facictrs shcaild not be under estimated. Heavy waves 
and wind can also move oil ashore and other sensitive areas 
very quickly than expected and may disrupt the cleaning 
operation. This may not only interrupt the clean up process 
but may led to failure of the clean-up equipments such as 
booms during the operation.
23
2.3.4. Clean-up Impacts
A long lasting damage to the marine environment ashore 
and along the coast could be increased by improper methods of 
cleaning up the spill. Different places require different 
cleaning methods and techniques which can be determined 
through scientific study of those places before actual spill.
Mechanical clean up methods should be properly applied 
according to the nature of a particular area. Mechanical 
cleaning at other areas such as the salt pans (marsh) and 
other special areas could be avoided and preventive measures 
being introduced instead. Where preventive measures failed, 
the "let alone" method could be considered for sensitive 
areas.Clean-up guidelines for different oil products are 
being provided in Figures 3(a), 3(b)'and 3(c) of the 
appendixes.
2.4.0. International Efforts In Oil Pollution Control
Having recognized the importance of shipping and its 
potentiality for oil pollution, international organizations 
such as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) and International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) were formed to regulate such activities. The IMCO which 
was super superseded by IMO in 1959 laid the foundation for 
the oil pollution prevention by adopting the International 
Convention for The Prevention of Pollution Of The Sea By oil 
(OILPOL.1954).
The IMO is a recognized international organization in 
the maritime field. Its main objectives are safety and 
pollution prevention. Upon those two objectives which 
seems to be broad in scopes various international 
conventions, codes and regulations or guidelines were 
developed. IMO instruments are dealing v/ith marine pollution
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in different areas. Some of them are too general while others 
are more technical and strict to all its members. It should 
be noted that those fall under (a) are mainly for safety of 
vessels rather than addressing oil pollution in particular. 
Their relevance to oil pollution lays on the preventive side. 
Fewer vessel accidents results in fewer pollution incidents. 
Following below are those which deal with pollution arranged 
according to areas of their subject matters;
<a> Prevention Of Accidental Pollution
- International Convention On Load Lines of 1966 and
- Convention On The International Regulations for 
Preventing Collision At Sea (COLREQ. 1972);
<b) Preventing of Marine Pollution
- International Convention Relating To Intervention On 
The On The High Seas In case Of Oil Pollution 
casualties (CSI 1969)
- Convention On Prevention Of Marine Pollution By 
Dumping (L.D.C." 1972),
- International Convention For The Prevention of 
Pollution From Ships (MARPOL 1973/78),
- International Convention For The Safety Of Life At 
Sea (SOLAS 1974/78) and
- International Convention On Oil Pollution Preparedness 
Response and Co-operation (OPRC 1990)
(c> Liability And Compensation
- International Convention On Civil Liability For Oil 
Damage (CLC 1969 and Protocol 1984) and
- International Convention On The Establishment Of An 
International Fund For Compensation For Oil
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Pollution Damage (I F C 1971)
This arrangement shows also the relations between these 
instruments within their areas of responsibilities and other 
areas. Those which are directly dealing with oil pollution 
are briefly discussed in the following pages. Their 
interrelation should be traced from IMCO's work.
1. Convention For The Prevention Of Pollution Of The Sea 
By Oil (OILPOL 1954)
The OILPOL was the first international convention to 
deal specifically with the problem of oil pollution at sea.
The convention was designed to minimize oil discharges from 
routine ship operations by controlling the pumping of oily 
mixtures from bilges and tanks washings. It did not take 
accidental pollution into account. This convention was narrow y 
in its scope. With exception of tankers, the convention 
applied only to ships of registered in contracting states and 
was only addressed to persistent oil. It undergone so many 
amendments till over taken by MARPOL.
2. MARPOL 1973/78
MARPOL superseded the OILPOL. as amended in 1969 and 
1971. MARPOL is the most important convention which deals 
with both operational and accidental pollution from ships.
It come about as a result of international concerns about the 
global environment including the ever increasing volumes of 
oil entering the sea especially the Mediterranean Sea. It 
could be viewed as an international response to the Torrey 
Canyon accident in 1967. The convention was adopted in 1973 
and strengthened by the 1978 protocol. Since the convention 
consists of five annexes and a number of regulations, our "
concern here is annex one which deals with oil pollution.
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Both Annexes one and two are mandatory to the contracting 
states.
MARPOL which is new in its nature in comparison to 
OILPOL. covers all the technical aspects of the pollution 
from ships. The convention applied to ships of all types 
including hydrofoils, boats air cushion vehicles submerse 
sable, floating crafts and fixed or floating platforms 
operating in the marine environment. Indirect pollution 
resulted out of the exploration and exploitation of the sea 
minerals is out of its scope. It does not address the land 
generated wastes dumped into the sea as this has been dealt 
with by the LDC 1972.
Annex 1 of the convention introduced more strict 
requirement such as the control of oil discharge from oil 
tankers and machinery spaces of all ships, requirements for 
the construction of ships to control accidental and 
operational discharges of oil. The discharge of oil mixtures 
with oil contents of 15 ppm or above from an oil tanker is 
prohibited except when all of the following are fulfilled;
- The tanker is proceeding en rout;
- The instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content 
does not exceed 60 liters per nautical mile;
- The total quantity of oil discharged on the ballast 
voyage exceed l/30~000 of the quantity of the oil 
carried in previous voyage for new tankers or 1/15-000 
for the existing tankers;
- The tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land 
and
- The tanker has in operation an oil discharge 
monitoring and control system and slop tank.
The discharge of effluent with oil content of 150 ppm 
or above from machinery space of the all ships is 
prohibited except when all of the following conditions 
are satisfied.
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- The ship is proceeding en route;
- the oil content of the effluent is less than 100 ppiOt
- The ship is more than 12 nautical miles from the 
nearest land and
- the ship has in operation an oil discharge monitoring 
and control system, oily water separating equipment or 
filtering equipments.
Such an amount is to be reduced if the current amendment 
to Annex 1. Came into force on 6, July 1993. The amendment 
provides for the allowable amount in the first category to be 
reduced to 30 liters per nautical mile and 15 ppm for the 
latter.
The convention requires that waters which can not be 
discharged in accordance with the above provisions should be 
retained on board and discharged to reception facilities 
onshore. All states part to the convention are required to 
have enough reception facilities at their ports and terminals 
for receiving such waters and oil sludge.
The construction and equipment requirements introduced 
by MARPOL are mainly for the reduction or controlling the 
operational and accidental oil pollution. Requirement for new 
tankers which were designed to keep a tanker afloat in the 
case of collision and stranding are also likely to be taken 
over by the double hull and equivalent designs requirements 
under the convention.
The measures for preventing and controlling operational 
and accidental pollution from ships are effectively' dealt 
with by MAE^OL. This has resulted into a tremendous,decrease 
of amount of oil spilled from ship by 60% from 1981 to 
1990.The implementation of the convention is left in the 
hands of the contracting states to ensure its success. Some 
countries like the European countries have adopted a common 
approach to implement such a convention. They have introduced 
a Memorandum Of Understanding <M0U) for state control system
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as required by the convention to ensure an effective 
implement of the convention requirements.
3.' Intervention For Oil Pollution 1969
This convention is designed to allow the coastal state 
to intervene in case of a vessel in distress. It is mainly 
for the life serving and pollution control purposes.
4. Civil Liability Convention 1969/76/84
The Civil Liability Convention came into being as a 
result of the Torrey Cannyon incidents in 1967 off the coast 
of England. The incident alarmed the international 
communities and forced them to thing of solutions to two 
major problems experienced by then. These includes, the 
identification of specific measures to be taken by a coastal 
state against a foreign tanker in trouble outside its 
territorial sea, which may threatening to damage to its 
coastal and related interests. And the problem concerned 
international liability and compensation which deemed to be
t
insufficient by then. It was after the adoption of the 
convention in 1976 the basic structure for the current 
liability and compensation was formed.
The CLC convention applies to, oil pollution damage 
resulting from spill of laden tankers and suffered in the 
territorial waters of the contracting states. Damage caused 
by other oil spills including those from none persistent oil 
(gasoline, light diesel oil, krosene) etc. other than laden 
tankers are not covered by the CLC. Unladen tankers and 
offshore plants are not covered by the CLC as well. The CLC 
does not address any of the preventive measures to be taken 
before actual clean spill took place.
Major issues related to ship owners liabilities.
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limitation of liabilities and compensation insurance as well 
as the court to which the actions for compensation are to be 
brought is laid down in the CLC.
5. International Fund convention 1971 - 76/64 protocols
The Fund Convention is an off-shot of the CLC. It came 
in to being as a result of in adequacy of the CLC provisions 
in administering its compensation to the victims of the oil 
pollution damage. The 1971 Fund as it is usually referred to 
led to the creation of an international fund lOPC in October 
1978 to supplement the compensation payable under the CLC.
Only those states which are parties to the CLC can 
become members of the Fund. The fund provides for, the 
supplementary compensation to those who can not obtain full 
and adequate compensation for oil pollution in damage under 
the CLC and to indemnity under the CLC. The fund provides 
that "if shipowner are not liable, or where they are liable 
but can not meet their liabilities the fund pays full 
compensation due, up to prescribed maximum".^®
The fund is financed by the persons who receiver more 
than 150 000 tones of crude and heavy oil in bulk. These 
persons are mainly oil companies of the member states. Like 
other international laws the fund enforcement is left in the 
hands of contracting states and their local administrations 
who are entrusted with the task of incorporating the 
convention into their national laws which will enable their 
local courts and administration to apply the convention 
provisions provisions.
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6. International Convention For Oil Pollution Preparedness
Response And Co-operation (O.P.R.C. 1990)
The O.P.R.C. provides for a global framework for 
international co-operation in combatting major incidents or 
threats of the marine pollution by oil. This convention is 
one among the few which address oil pollution from the 
practical point of view. The convention requires the 
establishment of oil pollution emergence plans on ships, 
offshore installations at sea, the ports and oil handling 
facilities. Further more, it calls for the establishment 
of national and regional oil contingency plans. Under the 
convention ships are being requested to have detailed 
shipboard oil pollution emergency plans mean while the 
authorities involved such as the port or harbour authorities, 
the ships' masters and so on are required to report without 
delay any information regarding an oil spill. Competent 
authorities are being requested to take action when the 
information is received. The convention requires for the 
neighboring states who are likely to be affected by such a 
spill to be notified without delay. In case of a serious 
incidents the IMO should also be notified according to the 
convention.
Apart from the above requirements the convention * 
encourages international co-operation at sub-regional, 
regional and global levels. These could be in a form of 
advisory service or technical and equipment supply at the 
request of other parties to the convention. The O.P.R.C. 
encourages for the international co-operation in the fields 
of research and development and training at all levels in the 
field of oil pollution. IMO has been trusted with the 
responsibilities to develop a "comprehensive training program 
in co-operation with governments, oil and shipping industries
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and have an oil spill combating equipment stock pile 
plans" ,
The convention is mainly beneficial international to 
developing countries who do not have necessary resources to 
deal with major oil spill when occur. The O.P.R.C. is a 
straight forward and convenient instrument which suggests 
joint actions to be taken in case of an oil spill.
7. United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS 82)
The UNCLOS 82 lays down international rules and •
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution of the marine environment from all sources. The 
general obligations of states are provided in article 192 of ^ 
the UNCLOS 62. Article 211 of part 5 of the convention 
addresses pollution from ship sources.
The provisions for the enforcement procedures are 
provided in the following articles of the convention:
- for the flag states (art. 217),
- for the port states (art. 218) and
—for the coastal states (art. 21 1(f), 194 3(b) and 220)
Article 219 and 221 of section 6 are related to issues 
of sea wealthness of the vessels and measures to be taken in 
order to avoid pollution arising from marine casualties. The 
responsibilities and liabilities of states to protection and 
preservation the marine environment are clearly stipulated in 
article 235 of Section 9.
Even though the convention is not yet in force, its 
principles are widely accepted and used world wide. UNCLOS is 
a comprehensive document covers ail aspects of marine 
environment including the manner in which marine resources to — 
be exploited and preserved.
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3.0 The Case Of Namibia
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter 
focuses on the Namibian situation in depth by explaining 
the oil related activities before and after independence.
It explains further the regulatory measures taken against 
oil pollution of the marine environment where appropriate. 
The information being given in this chapter recapitulate 
the ideas laid down under section 2.4.0 above and serves 
as basis for the coming proposals and recommendations in 
chapters 4 and 5 below. The chapter is divided into two 
parts in an attempt to describe events according to their 
time of occurrence.
3.1 Before Independence
Oil had always been the strategic and essential 
commodity for the survival of the South African illegal 
occupation during their regime in Namibia. Over the years, 
the South African authority spent large amounts of money 
on oil exploration mainly offshore its waters. This 
resulted in the discovery of a gas project at Mossel Bay, 
the only viable sources of hydrocarbon exploration in the 
country.
In the case of Namibia, unlike mining activities 
which dated back to the eighteenth century, oil and gas 
prospecting started only by the late 50s and 60s. A brief 
description of oil and gas prospecting is given in chapter 
1 and further explored under 3.2.2 below. Even though S.A. 
had great interests in the exploration and exploitation of 
the above referred resources, which resulted in the
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discovery of the Kudu gas field in 1974, its efforts were 
hampered by external and internal political pressures.*
The withdrawal of Chevron from the area could not be 
considered separately from the adoption of Decree no.l by 
the United Nations Council For Namibia on 27 September 
1974. The Decree states that "No person or entity whether 
a body cooperated or unincorporated, may search for, 
prospect, explore for, take, extract, mine process, 
refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural 
resources, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to 
be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia".^
By adopting such a Decree, the council concerned large 
damage caused to the Namibian resources and its eco-system 
in an unsustainable manner.
South African interest in the development of the Kudu 
gas field was very high in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
announcement by the South African authority in 1985 that 
it had "given approval for the drilling of more wells in 
order to further evaluate the Kudu field"=® proves such 
interests. Such an interest could have been strengthened 
by many factors. First, it should be understood that up to 
14 million tonnes of crude oil per year, at least 70 % of 
S.A. need for liquid fuel was imported. Secondly, the 
expectation of oil presence in the gas field was very high 
and the international political pressure which resulted in 
the United Nation mandatory oil embargo against the 
apartheid regime changed the tradition way of the oil 
importation to both S.A. and Namibia."^ i
South African efforts for oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation in Namibia failed. The UN oil embargo 
remained in force but South Africa remained the only 
source of all fuel needs for Namibia all the years. The 
political oil situation forced South Africa to keep all 
her alternative oil sources secret as much as possible.
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The Persian golf had been the major source of oil shipped 
to S.A. during the UN. mandatory oil embargo, especially 
the Emirate of Dubai was singled out for such activities.™ 
Much of the oil imported to Namibia was either 
through S.A. or shipped directly through the port of 
Walvis Bay and distributed within the country by roads or 
rails. Walvis Bay was believed to handle much of the oil 
imported to the Namibia while small amount was transported 
by rail or road from South Africa. The Netherlands 
Shipping research Bureau estimated that the port handled 
about 556,000 tones of petroleum products in 1965 and 
450,000 tones of the same products in 1986. An oil storage 
tank at Walvis Bay, was believed to have increased its 
storage capacity during the years of the 1970's and 1980's 
due to the increase of the South African occupation forces 
which consumed about 15,750 barrels a day. Civilian oil 
consumption in Namibia, which included transport, mining 
and fishing processing industry was about 7,700 barrels a 
day
The amount of oil handled at the port of Walvis Bay 
might have caused damage to the local surrounding. The 
type of products imported to Namibia all the years are 
those of toxic in nature as described in chapter 2. 
Knowingly the magnitudes and severity of damages caused by 
light and refined petroleum products especially those 
resulted from daily operation, the amount of oil being 
handled at port of Walvis Bay is large enough to warrant 
research for oil pollution around the port.
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3.1.1 Environmental policy
Environmental policy is inseparable from that of 
economics in general. The South African policies in 
Namibia were bounded and informed by the political 
economics *of apartheid which resulted in the plundering of 
the living and none living resources The South African
policies and actions left the country in dilemma about 
environment protection to which oil pollution is part.
These policies might have resulted in a wide range of 
physical abuse and damage to the marine environment. 
Overfishing -is one of the results of such policies and 
actions. Others like marine pollution from mining 
activities and minor oil spills from ports and oil 
terminals are examples of the non attendant problems.
Neither the South African authority in Pretoria 
through its environmental council nor the then Windhoek f
Administration assumed environment responsibilities - _
through out her colonial period in Namibia. The failure 
for South Africa to assign and or allocate such important 
responsibilities under one of the then 12 departments 
created in 1980 is evidence of their negligence concerning 
the environment and their interests in the plundering of 
the country to non-renewable stages. The marine 
environment in Namibia by which much of the activities, 
such as port and shipping activities are being controlled 
through or by South Africa may continue to suffer the 
consequences of its unique maritime laws as described in 
the next section. In addition to the South African laws 
and legal administrative machineries, the status of Walvis 
Bay have great impacts to the Namibian environmental law 
enforcement.
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3.1.2 South African Laws and Oil Pollution In Namibia
One may not start looking into oil pollution 
legislations without referring to the overall legal 
framework of the country during the South African colonial 
period. The South African authority categorized its legal 
system into two main categories as follows:*^
1. The Acts of the South African Parliament to which 
Namibia was bound and
2. Ordinances of the South West Africa Legislative 
Assembly which implemented legislations within the area
of competence of the then Windhoek Administration such 
as education, municipalities and so on.
Those which fall under the first category is where a 
number of important maritime Acts and regulations were 
included. They were subdivided further into two sub­
categories as follows:
(a) Those pertaining to international affairs, for example 
ratification of international conventions, in which 
Namibia had no say as a no-sovereign territory and
(b) Those specifically applied uniformly to South Africa 
and Namibia.
Such a classification helps to understand the 
implications of those laws to Namibia and her future 
maritime set up. With an exception of the Territorial 
Waters of South West Africa Proclamation of the South 
African Administrator in 1979, which intended to extent 
the country's territorial waters and EEZ, no other South 
African laws governing maritime affairs were in force in 
Namibia before independence. The principal South African 
statute governing commercial shipping, the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1959, applied to Namibia but was entirely 
administered from Pretoria.
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It has oust been indicated in chapters 1 and 3 above 
that all maritime activities including the harbour 
administration of Walvis Bay are carried out by the South 
African authority and the only port left under Namibian 
control is Luderitz, which has a limited capacity for 
cargo generating and sizes of ships it can accommodate. 
South African policy on environmental issues has also been 
noted as one of the implications of this subject. Now, the 
focus is on one and major element of the subject.
Following below are the South African maritime laws 
which address oil pollution and their status of 
applicabilities to Namibia.
- The Merchant Shipping Act of 1951 as amended by 
several times till the recent one in 1989; The Act 
applied to Namibia but was administered directly 
from South Africa;
- The Territorial Waters of The South West Africa 
Proclamation of 1979, exclusively applied to 
Namibia;
- The prevention and Combating of pollution of The 
Sea By Oil «Act Of 1981, the Act was administered 
from South Africa as well;
- The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1986, 
International Convention Relating to the 
Intervention on the Seas In the Case of Oil 
Pollution Casualties did not apply to Namibia.
South Africa is a signatory to the Load Line 
Convention and its Protocol of 1971 and acceded to the 
following IMO conventions some of being described already 
in chapter 2 section 2.4.0.
- International For the Prevention of Pollution From
Ships (MARPOL 73/78), . ,
- Convention On International Regulations for 
Preventing Collition At Sea (COLREG 72), .
- International Convention on Tonage Measurement of 
Ships (TONNAGE 69),
- International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC 
72) ,
- Torremolinos International Convention for the 
Safety of Fishing Vessels (SFV 77),
- International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watching for Seafarears (STCW 
76) ,
- International Convention on maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR 79),
- International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS 74/78),
- International Convention Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (CLC 69) but not to the FUND Convention 
of 71/84.
According to the categories above, all these 
conventions are not applicable to Namibia as they fall 
under category l.(a) above. The importance of these 
conventions is well known to both the South African 
authority and the international community. Among them are 
those already discussed in chapter 2 of this document. As 
being recognized above, full implementation of the above 
instruments lays in the hands o,f a particular country 
which is required to incorporated them into its national 
laws. Being a maritime oriented state Namibia is faced 
with the tasks of redressing the colonial errors and 
reconstruct its maritime sector, develop and protect the 
marine resources in a sustainable way acceptable to its 
domestic and the international environment. Without 
acceding to some of the above conventions and full control 
over its maritime affairs, Namibia's marine environment 
will remain at risky.
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As there was no marine environmental policy and none 
among the Windhoek Departments assigned such 
responsibilities, oil pollution in Namibia remained a non 
attended matter over the years. But due to the South 
African claim over the enclave of Walvis Bay and the 12 
mentioned islands, a local contingency plan (Walvis Bay 
Contingency Plan) was drawn up as part of the South 
African oil contingency plan. This plan seems to be well 
organized for the aforesaid areas only. As pollution does 
not recognize political boundaries, the ways for extending 
this plan to the rest of the Namibian waters. This coastal 
contingency plan could be used as reference for the 
adoption-or drawing up of local and national oil 
contingency plans for Namibia. More importantly the plan 
could be used for bi-lateral or regional oil contingency f
plan. It could be easily extended to the region or sub- 
region of Southern Africa. If oil is to be found and 
exploited its coast, Namibia might have much to benefit 
from such arrangement than other countries of the region.
Currently is only the South African Navy has the 
capability of carrying out search and rescue and oil spill 
response in the region. In August 1991 the South African 
Search and Rescue Unit carried put a successful operation 
when they rescued all 571 people on board of the Cruise 
Oceanos before it sank a day latter off the South African 
coast.In April 1992 they carried out air surveillance 
over the area where" Katina P" sank off the Mozambican 
coast. These are only some among many examples of that 
nature. More information on regional co-operation is 
provided in chapter 4. part B.
3.1.3 Oil Contingency Plan
40
3.2 After Independence
Namibia is now in her third year of independence. The 
first chapter of the paper described the country's 
background, and the first part of this chapter covered 
most of the relevant aspects related to oil pollution 
during the South African colonial period. The new 
development which the country has undergone since 
independence will now be looked into. This part of the 
document may lead to critical analyses and discussions of 
the subject and possible conclusions.
Namibia's transitional period could be more difficult 
and challenging than that of other African countries which 
got their independence in the early 60s, 70s and 80s. The 
state and its government are not only faced with domestic 
challenges over environmental issues as th& issue is at 
high level at international fora. International awareness 
of the human actions to the environment is more than an 
ordinary Namibian knows. The country which is being faced 
with environmental problems ranging from physical 
degradation of the.ecosystem to that of the consequences 
of the colonial actions may not have a common answer to 
such problems. Integrated efforts to insure proper 
utilization of both living and non living resource as well 
as the concepts of modern technology and clean production 
could be among many solutions surrounding this issue.
Marine environment protection in Namibia should not 
be left alone. A common approach by the government and the 
industry to marine environment protection could be 
achieved through scientific research and training of 
personnel for such purposes.
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3.2.1 Oil Situation
Except the trial consignment in 1990 of diesel and 
petroleum from Angola, the Middle East and Venezuela,
South Africa remained the only source of all petroleum 
products to Namibia. In 1990 the Namibian government 
adopted a global energy development policy and strategy 
for meeting energy needs. The policy is based on the 
implications of importing oil through South Africa and the 
country's energy potentiality as described above.
This policy is focusing on minimizing reliance on 
external energy resources and assume a greater and more 
active role in energy development by developing an 
internal energy infrastructure. As a result, NAMCOR a 
state-owned oil company is empowered to carry out various 
activities with regards to petroleum operations which 
include exploration and exploitation. In 1991 the company 
opened up offshore provinces for licensing to which about 
20 oil companies were reported as having "obtained seismic 
data packages from NAMCOR".
So far only fpur companies have been contracted for 
exploration purposes namely, the Norwegian Consortium 
consisting of Norwegian-based companies NORSK HYDRO, 
STATIAL and SAGA, Ranger Oil Limited the Canadian oil 
company which entered into joint ventures with Hardy Oil 
and Gas U.K. Limited, SASOL a South African company and 
Cheveron a North American/South African Consortium 
Consisting of Chevron Overseas and Eangle Energy. Apart 
from Cheveron which is awarded a license for an offshore 
area south of Luderitz, all are contracted for offshore 
areas north of Walvis Bay.^^ Among the designated blocks 
are those clearly indicated in Figure No 4. See the 
appendix section. The Namibian offshore area which has 
been estimated to be big as the "800 North Sea Block" and
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equal to the combined offshore areas of Gabon, Congo,
Zaire and Angola may involve many companies in the years 
to come.^^
Apart from the unexplored offshore areas, the 
government is now considering the possibilities for 
additional seismic and more drilling activities to 
determine the actual limits of the Kudu gas field which 
was hampered by political tension. The exploration and 
exploitation of such resources may not only cause 
environmental damages by the manner in which they are to 
be carried out, but the great danger lies with the means 
by which these resources are to be transported to shore or 
final destination. Gas and oil consumption in Namibia is 
very low, therefore, such resources may find a suitable 
market within the region.in which S.A. is considered the 
major partner. Transportation of gas oil to S.A. could be 
carried out either by piping to nearby towns and cities or 
by ships in case of oil. The potentialities of oil 
pollution from such means of transportation as given in 
chapter 2 of this paper should be taken into account in 
developing such facilities.
Currently there is no oil refinery along the coast. 
The one under construction at Usakos is about 400 km. from 
the western coast. The possibility for marine pollution 
from such project is rare. The same could be said about 
other onshore oil related activities. But Particular 
attention should be paid to the establishment of reception 
facilities at the ports and future oil terminals. The 
provisions of facilities for the reception of wastes is a 
requirement of all four annexes of MARPOL 73/78. Our 
concern is regulation 12 of annex 1.
However, this issue has been a controversial one. 
Firstly, their installations are too costly. Secondly, the 
wastes discharged should be treated for re-use again in
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the case of oil waste for example. Thirdly, the countries 
which installed them already seems to charge un—realistic 
fees for their uses. For Namibia where oil is being 
expected to be handled in large amount, establishment of 
such reception facilities should be the prerequisite. 
Without proper arrangements the country will suffer from 
illegal discharge of ballast water by oil tankers. Part of 
the solution to this problems could be the IMO manual on 
the reception facilities currently under consideration.
3.2.3 Namibian Laws And Oil Pollution
Environmental protection has received better 
attention since independence. "Namibia is one of the only 
five countries in the world to have included environmental 
legislation in its constitution" . While there are only 
few Namibian laws which address environmental issues, 
their primary sources are provided in by Article 95 <L) of 
the constitution which states that "the state shall 
actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by 
adopting policies aimed at the maintenance of ecosystem, 
essential ecological process and biological diversity of 
Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a 
sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both 
present and future, in particular, the government shall 
provide measures against the dumping or recycling of 
foreign nuclear and toxic waste on Namibian territory".^® 
In addition to the above provision, is Article 140 (1) of 
the Constitution which provides that "all laws which were 
in force immediately before the date of independence shall 
remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of 
Parliament or until they are declared 
unconstitutional by a competent court".=^^
Being given the descriptive of the legal instruments
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under which the country went through during the colohial 
rule and after independence, one might be in a position of 
understanding the implications or conflicting interests 
the country is being faced with. It should be noted that 
while Article 95 (L) is directed to environmental 
protection Article 140 <1) addresses the colonial legacy. 
This system has negative impact for the law enforcement in 
the country as a whole and the marine environment in 
particular.
So far, some amendments have been introduced to some 
of the inherited laws for meeting local demands but much 
has to be done for them to meet international 
requirements. Among the amended laws which deal with oil 
pollution is the Prevention And Combating of Pollution of 
the Sea By Oil Act No. 6, of 1981. Like other maritime 
legislations, the Act was never administered from within 
Namibia during the South African colonial era. So it was 
amended to redress such a situation and fit the local 
situation. What should be noted from the amended Act is 
that the content of the Act remains more or less the same 
to that of its predecessor. According to the speech to 
Parliament by the former Minister of Works, Transport And 
Communication, the technicalities of the Act restricted 
the amendments‘to specific issues. The only international 
convention referred to in the Act is the CLC 1969. No 
reference is being made to its amendment of 1976 and 1984 
or the FUND Convention and its Protocol which are regarded 
as offshoots from the CLC.
Annex 1 of MARPOL to which S.A. is a signatory never 
being referred to in this Act. Having amended this Act, is 
only a step forward mainly for the administration of local 
rules and regulations but fall behind international 
standards. Some short falls on non compliance of the South 
African laws especially the MARPOL has been noted.
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a.ccording to Mr. Brieckel of the Department of Transport 
The South African Institute of Marine Engineering Naval 
Architects, "a large tanker can lie 13 miles offshore and 
discharge her entire ballast and tank washing effluent 
with total impunity provided that the discharge does not 
exceed 100 ppm of oil in the mixture."’'^ ■ In such a case, 
the provisions of MARPOL described on page 12 of chapter 
two are not complied to. MARPOL requires that the tanker 
should be en route, oil content must not acceded 15 ppm 
and the tanker should be 50 miles away from-the nearest 
land.
Should such a situation allowed to continue in 
Namibia aS it has been, especially at the stage whereby 
tankers are expected to be involved in the transportation 
of the above resources, without specific national laws 
incorporating international rules regulating such 
activities, then Namibia is likely to face serious 
problems resulting from these activities.
It should be said that Namibia may incorporate some 
of the South African laws on oil pollution prevention and 
control in its laws for domestic benefits but acceding to 
international conventions directly offers more advantages 
than doing it through amending to the South African Laws 
which are unique to the international maritime field. It 
should be noted that having inherited the South African 
colonial system of Legislative Acts, a lot needs to be 
done for international compliance.
One of the Acts which address environmental issues is 
the Foreign Investment Act of 1990. According to Section 
(3) (e) of the Act, "in considering an application for 
certificate of Status Investment, the Minister shall have 
special regard to the impact of the activities of the 
enterprise in which the proposed investment is to be made 
is.likely to have on the environment and, where necessary.
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the measures proposed to deal with any adverse 
environmental consequences".^® In terms of oil pollution, 
the Act is strengthened by the provision of Section 71 of 
Petroleum Act. The two Acts are incorporated into a Model 
Petroleum Agreement dated May, 1991.
The Model addresses environmental responsibilities of 
the Mines and Energy Minister and the companies to be 
involved. It provides that any exploring company shall: 
"conduct its petroleum operations in the manner likely to 
promote the conservation of the natural resources of 
Namibia and the protection its environment; employ the 
most advanced technologies for the prevention of 
environment damage to which its petroleum operations might ^ 
contribute and for the minimization of the effect of such •, 
on adjoining or neighboring lands, and implement the 
proposals contained in its development plan regarding the 
prevention of pollution, the treatment of wastes, the.safe f 
guarding of the natural resources and the progressive 
reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by 
petroleum production" .
Subsequently, »-the Model requires the company to be 
involved in the exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gas to prepare and submit to the Minister its oil 
contingency plan prior to the commencement of the 
activities. The Model Could be described as one of the 
comprehensive documents addressing oil pollution from its 
sources, refineries and productions. It initiates the 
cooperation between state and industrial agencies. The 
expertise and experiences to be gained from these 
industries in terms of oil pollution are of paramount 
importance to the government especially in the area of 
local expertise development. The experiences of the 
contracted companies in oil exploration in other parts of ^ 
the world and the government's commitment to environment
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protection might have a positive result in the field.‘of 
oil pollution prevention for the marine environment. 
However, stiff national laws and regulations should be 
enacted to ensure environment protection.
Apart from the above discussed laws and other 
international instruments, Namibia is a signatory to the 
UNCLOS 1962. Even though the UNCLOS is not yet in force, 
its principles are widely used by both members and non 
members to the UNCLOS. The convention is one among the 
comprehensive international documents which covers all 
aspects of marine pollution including oil. Its application 
to Namibia offers the country a great opportunity to 
protect its marine resources from any of the above sources 
of oil pollution.
Now the government is consideration of acceding to a 
regional conventions, the Convention for Co-operation in 
the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the West and Central African Region 
particularly its protocol concerning Corporation in 
Combating Pollution in Case of EmergencyThis could be 
a starting point fpr Namibia to have access to 
international co-operation for oil pollution and an> 
emergency response.
A combination of experiences from other countries in 
this field should be utilized as well. There are countries 
both developing and developed, with good reputation and 
well recognized oil contingency plans from which Namibia 
can learn. Among the leading developed countries in oil 
pollution prevention and control are: Canada, the U.S.A., 
Norway, the U.K. and France.
Among the developing countries are the following: 
Singapore, Venezuela, the Bahamas and Nigeria. Even if the 
above mentioned countries have different structures their 
approaches*to the subject are common to all. The Nigerian
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experiences could be more relevant for Namibia. Nigeria is 
a major oil producing country in Africa. It has 
experienced many oil spills for almost 31 years. The 
available statistics has shown that, a total of 2, 796 oil 
spills were reported between 1976 and 1990 with an 
estimated quantity of 2, 105, 393 barrels of oil spilled-^^ 
The country had no national oil contingency plan till 
1990. Instead, individual oil companies' oil response 
plans were used to deal with minor spills. The companies 
formed up an association for the clean—up of medium or 
large spills. Having recognized the needs for national oil 
contingency plan, a national committee was appointed and 
toured different countries in different parts of the world 
to learn from their experiences. In early 1991 the 
committee organized a symposium to consider the "basic 
input to tl}e national plan, the plan structure, plan 
operations and maintenance".^^
The symposium was held in view of founding a national 
plan which incorporates both the Nigerian Navy, oil 
industries and other relevant government institutions 
especially the Federal Environmental Protection Agencies. 
Apart from local experts, people from other countries in 
the West African region and Europe attended the symposium. 
Namibia might have a lot to benefit from the Nigerian 
experiences at both bi—lateral and multi-lateral levels as 
they all members of the Western and Central African 
Cooperation in combating pollution. Experiences on the use 
of satellite such as those in Kaduna and Calabar (Nigeria) 
could be of special interest for Namibia. This could be 
useful to asses the possibilities of establishing the 
similar base along its geographical disadvantaged coastal 
line for both oil pollution and fishing surveillances. The 
move for co-operation between the two countries towards 
oil and gas development should not bypass marine
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environmental protection.
The extent to which the expertise of the contracted 
companies can be utilized depends on the government's 
approach to that end. Conflict of interests between 
companies and the state should be avoided. Experience has 
shown that companies operating in foreign states might not 
fully comply to the laws of operating country. In some 
cases they found some lop-holes in the legislations or 
they lose confidence in their contracts. Some of these 
companies have good reputation for environmental 
protection in their home countries, but they might not 
willing to comply to the laws of foreign country 
especially when they find that their interests are being 
threatened. In most cases, laws of the developing 
countries are flexible or not stricter than their own 
national laws under which they had been operating but they 
might not willing to observe them. There should be a 
conducive environmental co-operation between the state and 
the contracted companies if environment is to be protected 
as provided in the previous documents.
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cmae=*th:e^ 4
PART A: Preventive Measures
PROPOSED GUIDE FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCY PLAN
An oil contingency plan is an effort to deal with a presumed 
oil spill within a particular geographical location at an 
unknown time. In the process to develop a national 
contingency plan, attention should be paid to many varied 
considerations.
The existing situation must be studied in order to 
determine the threat probabilities to which the state might 
be subjected. If oil is to be explored or* exploited along the 
Namibian coast, it is self evident that the country will be 
subjected to the environmental risks that result from such 
activities. It is therefore the task of the Namibian 
government to make a risk assessment and come up with proper 
guidelines for oil spill prevention and control. As there is 
no data available on previous oil* spills in Namibia, 
assumptions based on other countries experience should be 
used to evaluate the threat. This initial step will help the 
government in drawing up its plan which can be executed with 
only slight modifications.
The identification of locations where oil pollution 
incidents are likely to occur and where the consequences are 
expected to be, is the most vital step in the preparation of 
a national oil contingency plan. Preparedness should be 
emphasized to prevent or respond to spills. At the sites at 
which oil is, or to be, handled in large quantities, such as 
tank farms, pipelines, oil terminals and refineries; the 
quantities and frequency with which such products are handled 
within different places, and the volume of shipping, 
especially tankers, and their routes to the Namibian ports
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and oil terminals must be identified.
The sensitive areas such as fish spawning areas, seal 
and bird colonies as well as salt pans must be identified. 
This combined with an understanding of the oceanographic and 
geographic characteristics of the Namibian marine environment 
will help the planners to forecast the possible effects and 
the environmental impact of an oil spill in the Namibian 
waters.
One pf the important roles to be achieved in oil spill 
contingency planning is the work and provide for co-operation 
among the authorities with overlapping responsibilities. Many 
agencies and institutions involved .in marine activities must 
be addressed in an effective contingency plan. Currently 
there are four government institutions who are directly 
involved in sea activities with other institutions to follow 
soon. The possibility for marine pollution from these 
activities is there.. The general responsibilities of these 
institutions in the event of a pollution incident need to be 
clearly defined in the plan.
The assignment of responsibilities and the establishment 
of lead agencies to c^versee the proper execution of these 
responsibilities by the different institutions is an 
important function of the contingency plan. The plan must set 
tasks for the various institutions with specific assignments 
to be carried out during oil spi11. operations, drawing skills 
from different sources hat are peculiar to their areas of 
expertise and within jurisdictions. Some risk areas of 
particular concern are pollution from:
- marine traffic in the Namibian waters and 
ports; offshore mooring points (connected to land based 
tankage etc); land based transportation or facilities; 
spills of unknown origin; and offshore mineral exploration 
and exploitation. It is possible that responsibility for 
each area could be assigned to different lead agency. But
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for the simplicity of these guides all could be expected to 
perform certain tasks under the head of the Ministry of 
Works, Transport and Communication.
The drawing up of the national contingency plan should 
not only be left solely in the hands of the government as 
private institutions have important roles to play in the 
development of such a plan. Experience from other countries 
has shown that the government alone will not be able to 
properly address oil pollution problems. Therefore, joint 
efforts by both government and industries have been proposed. 
The government of Namibia should must drawing up a plan and 
asses responsibilities in terms of resources drawn from 
as many different institutions as possible.
The government's task in national oil spill contingency 
planning is to ensure that adequate plans and resources 
either individually or collectively owned, are available to 
counteract any spill around and within the boundaries of the 
country. The major government task should be that of co­
ordinating different plans to form a national oil contingency 
plan. Such a coordination process should be done in such a 
way that each individcial institution involved be aware of 
their own responsibilities and those of others.
Because many institutions are to be involved in the 
implementation of the plan, it should be made simple, clear 
and understandable to anyone involved. In order to avoid 
confusion on who is responsible for what, the following 
points should be taken into account before making any written 
plan. There should be a clear-cut but flexible command 
structure at both national and local levels. There should be 
a well thought out procedure by which all those capable of 
making a contribution can rapidly marshal their resources in 
an orderly way.
The clear understanding of the situation and proper 
consideration of the above factors will enable the Namibian
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government to formulate its policy on oil pollution. Such a 
policy which has to define some major terms under which the • 
above referred to institutions should perform their duties 
should lead to good organizational structures for a national 
contingency plan. The plan should clearly stipulate the 
responsibilities of each of those to be involved.
1. Organization or InstitutionaJL Arrangement
The marine environment in Namibia is equally important 
economically as a number of other economic sectors onshore. 
Environmental planning for the marine sector especially in 
the area of oil pollution needs to be done by a body of all 
those involved in the above referred activities. They could 
meet under chairmanship of the National Planning Commission 
under the President's office if not a National Eiivironmental 
Committee.
As has been indicated already, there are many public 
institutions currently involved in marine related activities. 
Such a number may double or triple in the event of an oil 
spill, depending on the nature of a particular spill. 
Allocation of marine environment responsibilities under a 
single ministry could offer little advantages. Disasterous or 
national catastrophic oil spills may go beyond the capacity 
of a national contingency plan whereby international help 
should be sought. It is therefore assumed that, the committee 
made-up of different institutions should be formed to look 
after marine environmental problems including oil spills from 
different sources. The committee should draw up plans 
including information related to the description of each, 
equipment on hand, methods available for oil disposal, 
training of site personnel and plan implementation 
guideline.
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Due to the fact that government institutions are 
generally regarded as a single entity, their proposals on the 
subject matter should be compiled in co-operation and should 
incorporate local and industrial plans. Together, if properly 
organized and co-ordinated, they constitute a national 
contingency plan. To achieve this a clear-cut, flexible 
commanding structure and a proper procedure for its 
implementation is needed.
Below are prosed functions for various institutions in 
accordance with the IMO recommendations and the provisions of 
Section 29 of the Prevention and Combating of Pollution Qf, 
the Sea bv Oi1 Act Of 1991. These responsibilities need to be 
assigned before any attempt is made to develop a written 
plan. It should be noted that this paper is restricted to 
responsibilities rather than the posts to which they are to 
be assigned. Non existence of the relevant institutions such 
as the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard or the Navy 
to carry out this responsibilities are among the 
disadvantages to these proposals.
Namibia is a relatively small country compared to other 
maritime countries in the world. Due to the nature of its 
coastal line, the country may employ only a two-tier response 
structure at national and local levels. The former is the 
concern of this paper.
(A). National Elnvironmental Protection Committee ^NEPC)
There should be a National Environmental Protection 
Committee for oil contingency planning. The committee should 
be comprised of representatives of the ministries who are 
involved in the day-to-day activities in the marine 
environment, namely:
-The Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication,
-The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources,
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- The Ministry of Mines and Energy,
- The Ministry of Defence / Navy and or Coast Guard,
-The Ministry of Wildlife, Tourism and Nature Conservation 
and others as the need arises.
The committee should be should be invested with power 
for the formulation and administration of a national policy 
to control oil pollution. The committee's terms of 
responsibilities should be extended to planning and co­
ordinating response activities for emergencies involving 
other harmful substances, and to the protection of the marine 
environment in particular.
Concerning the National Oil Contingency plan, the NEPC 
should be responsible for taking active leadership in the 
identification of coastal natural resources at risk and 
available of response resources (skilled and trained 
personnel, finance and equipment) for effective control and 
plan implementation. It should work in concert with other 
institutions both national and international to identify 
critical expertise for the co-ordination of response to major 
spills and the exchange of information. The NEPC should also 
be responsible for nominating and appointing On-Scene 
Commander if so deemed. One of its major tasks should be 
regular review and amending the plan. It should ensure that 
the plan is enjoying mutual support of international, local, 
regional and international agreements. The NEPC should also 
encourage joint training and exercises for its nationals at 
all levels and assess the levels of training needed for 
particular courses.
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(B). The Technical Advisory Committee on Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan (TAC)
The TAC should be an executive body of the NEPC. The 
committee should consist of technical and administrative 
members from the previous mentioned ministries. It should be 
able to co-opt members from other government ministries as 
need arises. Some of the co-opted ministries could be:
- The Ministry of Home Affairs for public security and 
immigration purposes;
- The Ministry of Information and Broadcast for media and 
information publication;
- The Ministry of Local Government and Housing for the 
utilization of municipal facilities and equipment if 
necessary and
- The On-Scene Commander (an independent person) as described 
under <D) below.*
The committee should be responsible for the following 
duties and responsibilities: It should provide technical and
advisory assistance to the NPEC at any time, it should 
evaluate all matters rjelated to communications, surveillance 
and clean-up equipment; It should provide guidance to local 
authorities on the formulation of local plans, mainly by 
furnishing them with available information. The TAC should 
provide an immediate advisory function for the OnrScene 
co-ordinator during oil spill clean up activities.
It could be advisable for the TAC to meet under the 
chairmanship of the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication which should be the Lead Agency for plan 
implementation. The lead agency should be empowered by the 
NEPC to take control of the response if he feels, that the 
spill requires a National Response Team.
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(C). National Response Team (NRT)
Generally, an oil spill should be classified into two 
categories, i.e. minor and major spills, the former is when 
the spill released is within the capacity of the company or 
local agency responsible for oil spill response. It is 
therefore, assumed to be handled and contained at local 
levels. In such a situation, the national OSC Team could be 
represented to oversee the nation's ability to respond 
effectively if the need may arise. The latter is when the 
spills are beyond the capacity of the local response team 
whereby the national response team might be involved. In this 
case the national response team under the control of the 
designated officer at a national level (On~Scene Commander) 
should always be involved. The involvement of the national 
response team should be determined by-the NEPC through the 
request of the lead agency.
In the case of a catastrophic oil spill in which 
international assistance is to be sought, the agreed 
procedures on the means of communication, immigration and 
customs duties, accommodation and other related matters 
should be followed. Such responsibilities should be carried 
out by the Ope.ra-tion Group of the On-Scene Commander Team in 
the assistance of the pollution Prevention Department of the 
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication as discussed 
under 2. (A) below.
<D). The On-Scene Commander <OSC)
The On-Scene Commander is an official to be designated 
by law or competent authority such as the proposed NEPC 
and/or the Lead Agency to command and respond to particular 
oil spills. This person should be vested with the authority
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and responsibility of protecting the public interest, and 
should be accountable to the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication. The port Captain or one of the his senior 
staff members with nautical or environmental protection 
related background, may be appropriately for the post.
A unified command structure with clear responsibilities 
of the three identified bodies namely, the NEPC, the TAC and 
the OSC. may ensure an effective response to oil spill in the 
Namibian marine environment.
In carrying out his responsibilities the OSC should 
employ a structure capable of combining the available 
resources and promoting effective communication among the 
responders. This structure should be able to meet the 
challenge of an oil spill at all levels. Its capacity should 
be expanded to meet an escalating situation and accommodate 
multiple responding agencies such as joint operation at 
national and international levels.
Following below are the proposed groups of the On-Scene 
Commander's Team. This structure is also presented on a 
diagram on page 68 below.
*
1. Elxecutive Group
An executive group for the On—Scene Commander Team 
should consist of: the OSC himself and his deputy, heads of 
other groups outlined below and other advisory members of the 
TAC to address technical, financial and legal questions.
Such a group should be able to provide the OSC team with an 
overall management of oil spill incidents. This body should 
be viewed as a decision making body of the On-Scene Commander 
Team. It should be responsible for assessing the reported 
situation, determine the needed resources and implement the 
decision taken.
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2. Operation Group
No oil spill is identical to another. After notification 
of an oil spill more information on the spill is needed to 
determine the size of the response team. In many cases an 
observer could be sent to the scene but in some cases the 
number of people to be involved could be pre-determined by 
the OSC according to his own Judgement. In the case where the 
observer is sent, the nature and quantity of the product 
involved could also be used as a determining factor.
The composition of such a group may vary from time to time 
but major sections to deal with matters related to operation, 
materials, finance and administration of the event are always 
to be found in this group.
Initial responsibility of this group should be to 
assist in the formulation of a response strategy. This should 
include the implementation of shore line protection treatment 
and wild life rescue operations. It should include the 
co-ordination of response activities that in valves foreign 
governments or contractors.
3. Resource Assessment Group
The group should consist of leaders of the
- Resource Assessment or Surveillance Units,
- Site Assessment Unit and
- Documentation Unit.
The group should serve as a mechanism for the provision 
of co-ordinated, consolidated and comprehensive environmental 
information and advice concerning environmental impacts, 
resource sensitivities and other related matters. Such a 
group should identify the shore line protection, treatment 
priorities, methods for the operation section and liaison
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with the industries as well as assess institutions for 
information exchange. The planning group should meet under 
the chairmanship of a representative of the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources. The Ministry of Tourism, 
Wildlife and Nature Conservation should provide 
representatives to act as co-chairman.
4. EHiblic Affairs Group
The role of the media in an oil spill event should not 
be underestimated. The media has a major influence on a large 
part, if not the entire population. It is the Public Affairs 
Group under the supervision and control of the Lead Agency 
which will be charged with co-ordinating the flow of 
information from the OSC's team to the media for public 
release.
The chairperson of the group should be■responsible for 
determining who will act as spokesperson for the Ministry 
making contact with public affairs representatives and 
agencies or departments establishing basic procedures for 
information flow to the public, and maximizing the 
co-operation between all parties of the response operation to 
develop accurate information for release, and approving each 
and every written statement for release to the media.
2. Roles and Responsibilities of Institutions and Support 
Agencies Involved
In case of a major oil spill large institutions both 
private and public might be involved in such operations. 
Although individual private institutions might not have 
direct responsibilities over oil spills not resulting from 
their activities, they could be called up-on for joint 
operations. The industries may play a major role in providing
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equipment whenever the have any available. A major oil spill 
may go beyond the national response capacity and external 
help resources and expertise are to be required. Such a 
situation might be jointly addressed in plan as well. The 
provisions of international conventions, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, are of great advantages to such a problem.
Following are some of the institutions to be involved in 
major oil spills at national local and national levels.
1. Private Institutions-
Industries such as oil shipping companies, shippers' 
associations and other related organizations can play a major 
role in oil spill response. These are the bodies which are 
directly involved in the day-to-day activities in the sea 
areas from the private sector world-wide.
Although the industries (which pose a threat of 
pollution to the marine environment) are bound to respond to 
any oil spill resulting from their activities, their 
responses should be monitored by somebody else. Usually the 
Government Agency whicji oversees the industrial activity like 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy in the case of oil 
exploration and production should take the lead. The Namibian 
Petroleum Act dated May 1991, requires the industries to have 
their plans ready and employ all practical means to respond 
to oil pollution from their sources. These are the plans that 
should be incorporated into the national plan. Such 
incorporation strengthens the overall response capabilities 
of the national plan.
For efficiency of the national plan, the industry should 
be given greater chance to contribute to the plan formulation 
and implementation if required. It is the industry who will 
suffer financially if they proved guilty of polluting the 
environment; therefore, their participation in this process
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should be encouraged. Many countries have realized the need 
for their governments to promote and develop appropriate 
relations with industry in these areas. It should be in the 
interest of the Namibian government to have such 
relationship. A major benefit perhaps would be to assign the 
responsibility for stock-piling response supplies and 
equipment to the industries which pose the environmental 
risks.
The industries are expected to give the government a 
hand in terms of resources in the cases where they are rarely 
involved or when additional resources are required to 
reinforce the government's response capacity. In such a case, 
independent contractors could be made for other oil companies 
which might not be involved as ship or oil owners to render 
some assistance.
2. Government or Public Institutions /
The Namibian government should have duties and 
responsibilities to protect the public interests in the event 
of any oil spill. For .this purpose, some key government 
institutions and possible roles in the event of oil spill 
have been identified. It must be understood that some of the 
proposed institutions, such as the navy and coast guard, are 
not yet in existence in the Namibian government structure.
Their establishment is beyond the scope of this paper. But 
including them in the list below is intended to only show 
their importance in response to oil spill emergencies.
<A> Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication
As referred above, this ministry should be the lead 
agency in the implementation of the national plan. Therp 
should be a section or body responsible for oil pollution
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prevention and control within such a Ministry. This section 
should be led by a knowledgeable person, or expert in marine 
pollution matters. The Pollution Prevention Department should 
represent the ministry at any meeting of the TAG.
Among its major responsibilities in case of oil spills 
should be: Hiring vessels and crews, including local and 
foreign boats; identifying and providing heads of operational 
Sections for oil spills where appropriate; providing trained 
team leaders and special equipment from all possible sources 
for oil spill emergency response purposes, organizing, 
supervising and co-ordinating the travel of foreign experts; 
monitoring the maintenance of oil spill equipment and 
ensuring the conditions of all hired equipment including 
vessels and boats at the points of return.
(B) Ministry of Home Affairs
The primary role of this ministry in oil spill response 
is immigration and customs clearance of both foreign 
responders and spill clean-up equipment. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs should coopera'te with the customs officers and the 
Pollution Prevention Department of the Ministry of Workers, 
Transport and Communication for quick clearance of emergency 
equipment. Customs officials need to be notified at an'early 
stage of any loaned equipment which could be declared free of 
customs duties.
Apart from the above responsibilities, the ministry has 
an important role to play in terms of public security and 
safety of personnel at the scene. These include the 
following: to provide traffic control if necessary and to 
control people's movements during the clean-up activities 
especially when heavy equipment such as tractors and trucks 
are being used; to insure safety of the spectators especial 
in the case of flammable and other dangerous substances and
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ensure safety storage for oil spill equipment.
This is one among the few government institutions which 
could provide personnel as team leaders in the absence of 
special trained units, such as the coast guards and/or the 
navy. The police force or other members of security personnel 
could easily provide safety than any other ordinary 
personnel.
(C> Ministry of Local Government and Housing
In cooperation with the Department of Works (A above), 
the local authority or municipalities would be able to 
provide shore cleaning equipment and manpower resources. It 
is the municipalities who know the location where debris not 
contaminated with oil, can be burned or deposited unburned. 
All such sites are proposed to be near potential areas along 
the coast.
In the case where a clean-up process takes place at a 
non municipal area, particular attention should be paid to 
further ecological damage likely to be caused by the movement 
of people and cars. Oi,i collection and disposals along the 
coast which are not identified in local municipalities and 
ports, should be done under the supervision and control of a 
different institution. The Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and 
Nature Conservation could be among the appropriate 
institutions for such a purpose. The ministry should be in 
charge of identifying the routes and disposal sites. The 
impacts of clean-up activities to the ecosystem of the Namib 
desert which covers almost the whole coastline should be 
critically assessed before the commencement of the operation.
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<D> Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources should be 
in charge of providing maps or charts for the operation and 
advice on scientific matters related to operational 
techniques etc. It should work hand in hand with the TAG and 
the Ministry of Wildlife, Tourism and Nature Conservation to 
ensure that all environmental precaution measuj'es are taken 
into account during the clean-up operation.
<E) Ministry of Defence (Navy or Coast Guard)
The navy and coast guard units are commented for oil 
spill response and marine environment protection. Different 
coastal states are employing these institutions as permanent 
institutions in this field. Apart from the navy which is a 
military institution,.the coast guard could be organized 
mainly along military or civilian lines as the case in the 
U.S.A. and the latter is the case in Canada.
Among the duties they could carry out in Namibia should
the government fipd it important to establish them are 
search and rescue activities which could include oil slick 
surveillance and monitoring, and full participation in oil 
containment and clean-up operations. These institutions could 
be utilized for all oil spill related activities from 
planning to operations. Proper utilization of their resources 
will depend on priorities and operational establishment by 
the Namibian government.
Even if the two institutions are commended for such 
responsibilities, the navy seems to offer little advantage 
over the coast guard. These situation could be found where 
two organization could exist but their resources might not be 
pooled together for marine spill response purposes. In its 
report the Publie Review Panel on Tanker Safetv and Marine
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Soil1 Response Capabi1itv the Canadian Department of National 
Defense's capabilities in the area of oil spill response was 
reported as extremely limited. The report stated that 
"contrary to the public expectations, the Department of 
National Defence's capacity in the area of oil spill response 
is extremely limited because it does not possess spill 
response equipment."^
It is up to the Namibian government therefore, to set up 
any such organizations with clear roles and responsibilities 
on oil spill response. The Namibian coast guard or naval 
forces should be trained in such a way that they should be 
able to protect national resources from physical actions such 
as illegal fishing and harmful substances such as oil spills. 
Joint training and oil spill exercises to be discussed later 
in this chapter, should be one of the major tools the 
government employs to achieve its objectives of timely 
response to oil spills at all levels.
(F) . Miiiistry of Mines and Elnergy
The role of the Mines and Energy Ministry's activities 
concerning oil spills could be restricted to spills which may 
result from oil drilling and oil production activities in 
operation. For these the ministry could serve as the lead 
agency. However, the expertise of the ministry should be 
utilized at ail levels of oil spill contingency planning.
(G> Others
Other ministries such as the Ministry of Justice and 
Legal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance might not have a 
physical role to play in the operation of the spill other 
than giving an advisory opinion with respect to their field 
of competency.
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Contingency Planning and Emergency Response
Operational spills and illegal discharge of oil into the sea 
has been identified as major source of oil which occurs 
regularly in the marine environment. Apart from tanker 
operations, oil transfer operations during fueling of vessels 
possess major and long lasting threats to the environment.
Major, or catastrophic events, such as the Nestucca off 
the coast of Washington, the Exxon Valdez in Alaska, and 
Amoco Cadiz off the French coast produced extensive visual 
evidence of a significantly altered environment that with 
visible oil slicks attracted public attention and focused 
interest incapability to deal with catastrophic events. But 
little attention is being paid to the regular and most 
harmful spills which take place around ports and oil 
terminals. Loading and unloading of tankers are one of the 
major elements of such spills.
Some of the major regular spills in and around ports go 
undetected for period's of time resulting in chronic pollution 
of localized areas over time. Such a situation should be 
properly addressed in Namibia and the above referred case of 
Walvis Bay Port where the extent of oil pollution problems 
has not yet been determined. This should be looked into 
before the commencement of the handling other types of oil at 
that port in order to determine the present water qualities. 
Data of the first research should be used as a basis for 
future research on oil pollution at that port and the 
potential for pollution at other terminals to be.
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1. SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance of oil spill is a part to the marine 
pollution regulations and law enforcement process. It can be 
done in two ways, regularly and after actual spills take 
place. Many countries have recognized the former as one of 
the effective measures by which polluters are being detected 
and convicted. Such a process is provided in almost every 
international convention and national law dealing with oil 
pollution. Among them are UNCLOS 82 and MARPOL 73/78. Article 
192 of the UNCLOS 82 provides for the general obligations of 
the state to protect and preserve the environment.
Both articles 56 and 235 of UNCLOS 82 provides such 
responsibilities on the coastal state by stating that "states 
are responsible for the fulfillment of international 
obligations concerning the protection and prevention of the 
marine environment."^ Such requirements are also provided in 
Paragraph 3 of Regulation 9 of Annex 1 to MARPOL 73/78 which 
requires Governments or parties to the convention to 
investigate the visible trace of oil whenever observed to the 
extent they are reasonable to do so.'®
Different countries have employed different means of 
achieving such objectives. The widely used ones are patrol 
boats, fixed wing airplanes and helicopter. Air planes fitted 
with side-looking radar, infra-red and ultra-violet sceanning 
equipment for detection and surveillance of oil at sea.
Today only the surveillance of illegal fishing is being 
carried out in Namibia in which patrol boats and hired 
aircraft are being used. Oil exploration and exploitation 
along the coast may require permanent employment of the above 
described means of surveillance. No doubt, such planes and 
equipment are costly for the government but they offer more 
advantages than patrol vessels in case of spill monitoring. 
Not only does air surveillance help to detect and convict the
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polluters but it allows the determination of the location, 
movement and extent of the oil spill. Aerial monitoring is 
critical to the effectiveness of the On-scene Commander 
control and ability to direct counter pollution operations.
To ensure proper protection of its long and rich coast 
line, and to improve its current surveillance system, Namibia 
should employ some of this equipment. They could be 
effectively used if they are to be entrusted under a separate 
body or bodies such as the coast guard or the navy with 
specific roles for oil spill surveillance.
Preferably, this should be the coast guard, because the 
navy is likely to be dominated by military activities rather 
than that of environment protection. These institutions could ^ 
be supported by a satellite centre onshore. The centre could 
be jointly run under a surveillance program by the government 
and the industry. It should be in the interest of both 
fishing and oil companies and the government to set-up such a ^ 
centre to monitor illegal fishing and oil spills.
The air surveillance program should first focus on areas 
where pollution problems from unidentified sources are likely 
to be, and then be extended to other areas within the 
Namibian waters. The current technological development in 
tank design and tight marine safety regulations at the 
international level may change the trend whereby tanker 
washing might not be a major source of pollution. Therefore, 
consideration for oil pollution should be extended to the 
increasing number of fishing boats due to the creation of new 
companies and the possible increase of other cargo vessels. A 
program for oil and gas platform overflights should be 
designed and integrated within such plans. In the case where 
air surveillance is to be provided. Considerations should be 
given to acquisition or hiring of helicopters to observe and 
determine the extent of reported oil spills. In the absence 
of the helicopters and aircraft, as the case is today, a
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more or less formal agreement should be entered into with an 
aviation company.
The extent of which this agreement will depends on 
particular needs. Even if company's service is to be needed 
only for oil spill monitoring after the spill has been 
reported, such arrangement should be provided for in the 
contingency plan.
2. Reporting and Sample Taking
The need for oil spill reporting has been recognized 
along with the threats caused by pumping overboard of bilge 
water and residues from tanker cleaning operations. The issue 
has been fairly dealt with at international and national 
levels. Reporting of oil spills is among the major 
requirements of the International Oil Pollution Preparedness 
Response and Co-operation Convention of 1990. Section 3 of 
the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
Act of 1991 established these principles for Namibia.
The oil spill contingency plans should identify an 
agency to which a particular spill could be reported. The 
reporting procedures should be organized in such a way that 
any one who observed the spill can easily report it to the 
right officer at the right time.
One should understand the fact that ordinary Namibians 
who could observe the spill first, might not have access to 
interest in, or knowledge of the plan. For these reasons, 
both offices' and residential telephone numbers of the above 
referred officials should be listed with other national 
emergency numbers such as the police, the ambulance and the 
fire brigade. Such provision does not overrule the 
requirement for these numbers to be included as appendixes in 
the plan as required by the IMO guides for oil spill
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contingency plans?.
The NEPC and the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication should co-operate in the following areas for 
public education about oil pollution:
- the dissemination of information on the 
effects of marine spills and spill reporting 
procedures and
- the establishment of a system whereby people who file 
reports leading to the conviction of an allegedly 
polluter may be rewarded.
The government should make it a custom for individuals 
to report all oil spills irrespective of the size and 
apparent seriousness. But the proof on its legality, nature 
and quantities should be left for the pollution prevention 
officer (P.P.O.) who will be a member of the On-Scene 
Commander Team.One of the most important part in oil spill reporting ^
procedure is when information reaches a designated pollution 
prevention officer ( P.P.O.) who is required to document the 
report in a written form. Usually a printed form is required 
wherein all detailed Information is entered. According to the 
IMO Resolution MEP 26 (23) this information should include:
- particulars of the ship (polluter's name, type, port 
of registry and official number);
- time (date and local time of observation);
- the geographical location of the spill;
- marine meteorological conditions prevailing in area 
(wind, waves and temperature);
- the extent of pollution (type and estimated quantity 
of oil spilled) and
- other related information (name and address of the 
witness, taken or intended action etc). See Schedule
III in the appendix section on the list of possible evidence 
on the alleged contravention of the MARPOL 73/78.
73
It is provided that the P.P.O. could supplement the 
report with relevant information as required by the recipient*, 
or deemed appropriate by the one sending it. The supplemented 
information should include observation on further 
developments of the spill and notification of the states 
likely to be affected by the spill. Namibia can easily 
benefit from these procedures as they are easily implemented 
and simple to follow.
(a) The roles of On-scene Commander in Oil Reporting 
Procedure
The On-Scene Commander who is designated in the 
contingency plan, or just appointed by the regulatory agency 
at the time the spill is reported, should be charged with the 
following responsibilities:
- He should investigate and confirm all the reports,
- advise the person or authority with the polluter's 
organization of their liability for containment and 
clean-up actioh,
- evaluate various options for containment and clean-up, 
and
- convene a meeting for the TAG if necessary to 
determine the seriousness of the reported spill, and 
initiate appropriate action to contain the spill.
Immediacy of response is crucial. Therefore, the 
reporting procedure for a spill, which is likely to affect 
other adjacent states, should be clearly provided in the 
plan. For effective response to any incident, reporting 
through central authorities such as embassies and foreign 
ministries of the neighboring states should be avoided by all 
possible means. In the case where no joint contingency plan 
is in force, special arrangements at local levels should be
made in advance to ensure effective reporting procedures 
between the two neighboring states. The chart at the end of 
this section illustrates the procedure by~which information 
could be channeled during the accident took place.
(b) Sample Taking
Sample taking is one element of investigation procedures 
mainly done by the P.P.O. Once the spill is reported, the 
P.P.O. is faced with the task to provide evidence that oil 
has been illegally discharged and that it was discharged from 
the suspected ship. The P.P.O. is required to act quickly in 
takinq his samples. In reference to chapter two, 2.3.2 an oil 
spill can break apart and start loosing parts of its 
components within 24 hours therefore the appropriately time 
for sample taking should be the first hours after the spill 
occur.
In the case where the suspected polluter has been found, 
samples should be taken from any of the potential sources 
such as its cargo, ballast, slops, bunkers, bilges lubricants 
etc. All these requirte a trained and well informed P.P.O. 
about sampling implications. The P.P.O. should deserve 
respects of the crew members if it is taken from a certain 
vessel. Formal appearance and self presentation of the P.P.O 
to the officers of the suspected ship may avoid confrontation 
between the crew and the P.P.O.
Apart from the P.P.O. there should be an appropriate 
analyst appointed under the laws to which collected samples 
are to be taken. When it is not convenient to use the service 
of analyst, any other laboratory may be used to obtain 
analysis of the sample. But the name of the analyst should be 
obtained and recorded as it may be necessary for an 
appearance before the court for purposes of cross~ 
examination.
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In order to avoid the cost of unnecessary analysis when 
the accused pleads guilty, oil samples might be stored until 
the preliminary hearing. The necessary storage facilities 
such as refrigerators to preserve the sample and the lockers 
to provide security should be made available. Samples need to 
be kept in such a manner that continuity of possession may be 
proved. To ensure such a possession, samples should be kept 
in a locker from the time of collection, through analysis at 
the laboratory and until such time as it is tendered in the 
court as evidence. There is a possibility for the Court to 
reject that sample if it was not properly accounted for and 
testified to.
This testimony is required to establish the identity of 
the exhibition i.e. to find out whether it is the same 
exhibit and the its condition remains the same. Any change in 
quantity or nature of the product should be carefully 
observed and accounted for.
The container of a liquid sample must be clearly marked 
for the identification by each person who has had custody of 
that particular sample at a time. The mark, (usually 
initials) should be a'ccompanied by the date on which the 
custody was taken, and a designation by letter or number 
which will serve to distinguish it ready from others similar 
to it. Any such identification marks used must be applied 
while the sample is in that person's custody.
The government should make a rule that conveyance of 
samples to the laboratory should be done by hand and taken 
directly to the analyst. If they are to,be shipped by public 
carrier, registered mail or express which provides a record 
of transmission and signed receipts signature upon delivery 
could be used, but other methods should be avoided. The 
carrier should be made aware of the possible contents or 
nature of the sample as restrictions on its delivery may 
apply. The receipts issued by the carrier to the shipper will
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probably be required as evidence by the court therefore all 
should be account for.
It is essential that all those involved in sample 
taking, transportation and analyses, be informed about the 
importance of each step in the sampling process. If it is to 
be presented before the court, then "the court should be 
convinced that the sample in question is indeed that which 
the officer took from the place where the offence was 
committed and that it has not been manipulated or altered 
other than for the purpose of the analyses"^. The government 
should be aware of the fact that well organized and informed 
state agents should assist the state to convict the alleged 
polluter. Nevertheless, there is a possibility for the state 
to lose the case and suffer the physical environment and 
financial consequences if the P.P.O is not well informed 
about this task.
3. Reporting and Actual Clean-up of Oil Spills
#
Prior to the actual clean-up of the spill, there should 
be a clearly defined clean-up policy with a clear indication 
on when and how to deal with spills. The circumstances in 
which spills are to be left alone should also be indicated in 
that policy document. The let alone principle has to be 
applied only when physical or mechanical clean-up has been 
considered more harmful to the environment than the natural 
degradation or the probability of damage is low.
Oil contingency planning is the means by-which such a 
policy could be implemented in Namibia. The plan should make 
provisions for various response options to be considered.
Such options should be based on a careful evaluation of 
socio-economic, aesthetic and ecological factors of the 
affected area as discussed under section 2.3.0. Some of the 
factors to be considered in the evaluation process are those
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discussed in chapter 2 (2.3.0). In relations to the summary 
of different methods for the cleaning of differed shore lines 
provided in Figures 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of the appendixes, 
the procedure on the clean-up operation is illustrated by the 
information flow chart at the end of this chapter.
The identification of a possible source of shoreline 
work force in the plan will help the OSC. to decide on 
whether a spill response team should need iBBore personnel than 
those indicated in the plan. This might be the case where 
local labour are to employed for such a purpose. The 
challenging task for the OSC in carrying out these 
responsibilities is ensuring the availability of resources 
discussed in the next section. It will be at this stage when 
continuous surveillance is required to provide detailed 
information on the spill movement. The capabilities of this 
surveillance in determining the actual or potential size of 
the spill may help the OSC to determine the size of his task 
force.
While individuals responsible for oil spill clean-ups 
are required to be familiar with any law prohibiting or 
restricting the use o'f specific clean-up measures, the OSC. 
should ensure that safety of personnel and properties 
involved in the operation is his first priority. Safety 
awareness nationwide should be one of the public education 
programmes to be carried out by the OSC in conjunction with 
the lead agency (NEPC). Taking into account that Namibia has 
not been a maritime nation, such a program could cover a wide 
range of environmental related topics, such as the importance 
of the marine environment and marine environment protection 
to the economic well being of the country.
Both formal and informal approaches could be used to 
implement this program. The use of T V, radio and school text 
books should be among the methods to be used. The government 
should prepare information kits explaining how marine spills
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(a) Human Resources
It might not be sufficient to identify the availability 
of a shoreline work force in the plan without looking into 
the critical role of human resources in the clean-up 
operation. It should be understood that it is the human 
activities which result in oil spills and therefore, people 
must be expected to clean-up the spill and restore the 
condition of the environment. Such requirement in Namibia is 
provided in Section 5 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act of 1991.
In this section, human resources are identified in three
groups, namely, experts, skilled personnel (local members of
staff) and unskilled personnel. The availability of expert
personnel who are the driving force of the operation should
/be ensured at all levels of the plan implementation. Since 
foreign experts are likely to be contracted in the event of 
an oil spill in which the Namibian government could 
participate, it is important that the identified experts 
should be accessible at any time. Because speedy reaction to 
the spill mainly depends on experts, their early arrival 
should be among the priorities of the on-scene co-ordinator. 
If foreign experts are to be involved, special attention 
should be given to their emergency travel documents.
Second to the experts, are the local staff as discussed 
in part A. <D) above. It should be noted that without well 
organized and qualified staff members serving in the above 
mentioned groups, there is little chance for the clean-up 
operation to succeed. Even if local staff members are 
preferable, experienced foreigners should be contracted to 
lead some of these groups with the assistance of local staff.
It is self evident that a small handful of newly trained 
maritime personnel in Namibia would not be able to deal with
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a catastrophic oil spill. On this ground, the plan should 
provide for possible use of foreign experts and/or response 
teams. More on possible ways by which foreign response teams 
could be arranged is discussed in sub-section <C) below.
Unlike the above two groups which consist of experts and 
professionals, the last group is rarely made up of educated 
personnel. The fisTiermen, port and municipal workers could be 
among those used in Namibia today. Although the group is made 
up of local people, it full participation in the coastal 
clean—up operation is mainly influenced by two major factors, 
i.e. the availability of food and accommodation. In the case 
where a large number of these people are to be used, safety 
and security regulations should be strictly observed. Many 
safety related problems could be avoided if permanent bodies, 
such as a coast Guard or navy, with standard safety rules and 
regulations for oil spill operation activities, were to be 
used.
<b) Equipment and Materials
The need for equ-ipment is equally important to that of 
human resources in the clean-up operations of oil spills. 
Without the required equipment, decisions on whether response 
operations should start at sea or begin with protection of 
the sensitive areas would be delayed. It is therefore 
important that the plan should outline clearly the types of 
equipment to be used and their accessibilities by the 
response organisation. Considerations should be given to all 
types of equipment, which includes those for containment, 
recovery and support operations. Developing technology and 
any new methods of dealing with oil spills should be 
considered in determining the required equipment. The 
government should therefore, prepare to have means of keeping 
in touch with the relevant institutions on this matter. The
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World Catalog of Oil Soi11 Response Products By Robert 
Schulze, could be among many to be recommended. But such 
information could be found with almost every oil company.
The success of oil containment at sea depends on how 
well the equipment is maintained and how fast boats and 
vessels are being deployed for that purpose. The government 
should establish its priority for obtaining fishing boats and 
other vessels to help in such operations. No time should be 
wasted to protect the marine environment from an oil spill of 
any kind. Experience from other accidents shows that even if 
containment at sea is preferable, oil can reach the shoreline 
before the response team gets into full operation. In a case 
where sensitive areas are likely to be affected, their 
protection should be made in the quickest possible way. 
However, if protection is not feasible, or the area to be 
protected has been already affected, clean-up operation 
details should be determined. The care which must be 
exercised in the use of dispersants can not be over 
emphasized in this paper as it should be under the control of 
experts or scientists.
In the case where the response team has arrived at the 
scene before all relevant equipment, simple equipment 
available, such as locally made straw can be used although 
this can only be done under the supervision and advice of the 
experts.
(c) Means of Communications
Unlike the previous identified resources, which could be 
either borrowed or jointly mobilized in conduction with 
foreign institutions, the means of communications is mainly a 
domestic issue. The previous section on surveillance has
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shown how important information is to the response of the 
clean~up operation. It should be understood that this 
information could be misguiding if there is no proper channel 
through which it is conveyed to receive it. Adequate 
communications are required to provide contact between 
different sections of the operation including the 
headquarters and afloat officers. The use of land telephone 
lines, telex and radio facilities should be appropriately for 
a -country like Namibia with a long uninhabited coastline.
The unique geographical nature of the Namibian coast may 
require a well equipped communication centre in the case of 
oil spill response. The aforesaid centre should be run by 
knowledgeable persons as described in part A. <D) above.
Due to the scarcity and high expenses involved in the 
resources mobilization and coordinations, proper thought 
should be given to whether all are to be found and operated 
from within Namibia or are to be obtained from foreign 
sources. In the event whereby the latter has been preferred, 
the arrangement should be made for a bilateral or 
multi-lateral joint'contingency plan. If the bi-lateral 
approach has been chbsen, then the Namibian government and 
its counter parts have to agree on the roles each of them 
should play in case spills take place. Never the less, if a 
number of nations are involved, possibilities for IMO 
involvement in the' plan formulation process should be 
considered. Direct IMO assistance to Namibia may not be 
needed as Namibia is a member to the Convention for 
Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African 
Region in Case of Emergency, the product of the UNEP. The 
corporation has progressed in terms of organisation but a lot 
needs to be done to make it of practical value.
Generally there are two ways by which international 
arrangement on oil spill response could be made. First, a
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joint plan could be drawn up with or without joint response 
to the incident. In this case parties have to decide on the 
following :
- division of responsibilities between themselves;
- harmonization of the national plans to facilitate the 
joint plan;
- the activation of the joint plan;
- the control of national resources and
- the means and channels of communications between 
national authorities.
Secondly, the arrangement could be done in a rather 
simple way of mutual assistance between states. Under such 
arrangement, parties are simply seeking loans from each 
other. The most important factor to be considered under such 
arrangement is the placement of resources. It should be 
clearly stated that requested resources should be absolutely 
at the disposal of the requesting government or they will. 
remain under the tactical control of the providing 
government.
There is no doubt that state capabilities in dealing 
with oil spills diffac from one to the other. In this regard, 
Namibia may benefit from both the bi—lateral agreement with 
South Africa who has already developed its response 
capabilities and the multi~lateral arrangement of the West 
and Central African region under the auspices of the UNEP.
The former is preferable especially for a short term because 
there is no oil contingency plan in Namibia and other 
countries in the regions, such as Angola, Mozambique and 
Madagascar can benefit from it as well. Such an arrangement 
could be extended to the sub-regional co-operation in oil 
pollution control.
Namibia could be used as an oil spill response operation 
centre for both the West and Central African and the sub­
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regional co-operations. The country is well located 
geographically and future development of oil may influence 
such a decision.
A joint contingency plan should address issues, such as 
the exchange of information on the type of resources each 
party can make available, who is to be contacted in case of 
an oil spill, the means of communications to be used and more 
importantly, how resources are to be controlled during the 
operation under the direction of a single on—scene commander.
In all cases, financial matters relating to operation 
and expense recovery from the polluter needs to be well 
understood by the parties concerned. Matters relating to 
workers' wages and salaries, over time and currency in which 
they are to be paid should be sorted out beforehand. In the 
case of mutual assistance, all should be left for the 
requesting party solve it.
5. Expense Recovery
This section provides information on administrative 
procedures to be followed during an oil spill operation in 
Namibia which the National Response Team may respond to. It 
addresses only the costs associated with the physical removal 
of the pollutant itself. It is intended to help the 
government to recover most, if not all, of the money 
expended during the clean-up operation. It refrains from 
addressing legal implications covered by international 
conventions discussed in chapter 2. Compensation for 
environmental damage is left for the court of law and legal 
experts.
Although compensation for the operational clean-up and 
environmental damage are interrelated in the sense that all 
are to be claimed from the polluter, there is a slight 
difference in their administrative procedures. The proof of
environmental damage is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Under the law, the minister has authority to spend government 
fund during an oil spill on the assumption that it should be 
recovered from the polluter. To recover all what is impended, 
a record of all expenditure and losses encountered during the 
operation should be kept. An effective way to accomplish this 
is through the full utilization of the Operation Group of the 
On-Scene Command Team as discussed in Part A (D) 2 of this 
chapter.
Without proper administrative machineries to take 
account of all receipts and other relevant information on 
stock piles, the state might not recover all the expenses.
The state should also be aware that, although the polluter is 
financially liable for the pollution he causes, he has the 
right to present proof before a court of law that the cost 
and expenses claimed by the affected state are not 
reasonable. If his challenge against to the state is 
convincing, then the state must provide evidences to 
substantiate its claim. If this can not be done, then it is 
likely that the state will lose the case and suffer from the 
consequences.
Following below are some of clean-up costs provided by 
the Canadian Coast Guard by 1990. The amount is recorded in 
Canadian and U.S. dollars where appropriately. The last 
figure is on the "Katina P" incident off the Mozambican 
coast. The barge "Nepco 140" which ran aground in the St. 
Lawrence Seaway in 1976, released 1000 tonnes of oil and cost 
$22.7 million Canadian to clean-up; In March, 1979, the 
"Kurdistan" released more than 7 100 tonnes of Bunker C oil. 
Clean-up cost more than $12.4 million Canadian; The barge 
"Nestucca" released some 875 tonnes in December, 1988, with 
costs and claims in excess of $15 million Canadian; The cost 
to the U.S.A. federal government alone in 1990 for the Exxon 
Valdez spill response was $122 million (U.S.); In February,
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1990 a grain carrier and a fishing vessel collided in the 
Canadian waters which resulted in the latter releasing 40 
tonnes of diesel oil. The associated clean-up cost were about 
$1 million Canadian and The "Rio Orionoco" which grounded in 
Canadian waters in October 1990, spilled some 100 tonnes of 
oil. The costs for clean-up were $9 million CanadianIn the 
case of "Katina P", off the Mozambican coast, the costs of 
contracted labourers were estimated at only several thousand 
U.S. dollars, simple because of the cheap labour system in 
the country. However, the total claim was estimated at 4.5
million dollars (U.S.) ^
Because the state could be challenged and the 
possibility exists of it losing the case, Namibia should not 
found unprepared to recover the clean-up cost of any oil 
spill. In determining a national contingency plan, 
consideration should be given to designing a standard form 
which could be used throughout the operation where a national 
response team is involved. The form should be made easy to be 
fill in and be attached to the plan. It should be subjected 
to regular review and amendments by the NEPC.
In the case of a joint* operation each state should keep 
records of costs for the operation, but, it is recommended 
that the cost recovery be led by the country responsible for 
funding the operation. At this stage, the involved states 
need to have close co-operation as the polluter may try to 
find all the loop holes to avoid paying the costs.
For the purpose of improving the government is response 
capabilities, the plan should be reviewed immediately after 
an operation. This will help the government identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The comments and 
criticism of the public, the media and other interested 
parties, if valid can be reflected by an amended plan. The 
Technical Advisory Committee on Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
(TAC) should be trusted with these immediate
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responsibilities. This should not interfere with the 
periodical review of the plan by the NEPC and its advisory 
committee < TAG) provided in part A. of this section.
6. Training and Exercises
How successful contingency plans are executed depends on 
how well the participants have been trained. It is obvious 
that Namibia is being faced with the problem of manpower 
shortages in the .maritime field. This problem can be traced 
from the fact that the country has never been a traditional 
maritime nation. All of its maritime activities, including 
the present operation of its only deep sea port, have been 
carried out by South Africa. Although there are a few 
Namibians who are trained in this field, such as the World 
Maritime University graduates, and a few others who could 
serve as heads of the above proposed groups under part A <D>, 
their participation in such activities depends on their 
placement in the civil service as a whole.
Since operational oil spills do not only result from 
onshore activities, t*he country needs to have an operational 
training program that covers the containment of oil spills at 
sea as well. The interface of the onshore and offshore 
operations should be seriously looked into before a training 
program for those to be involved is designed. Before any 
attempt is made to establish an operational training program, 
one has to understand the objectives of the training.
Experience has shown that, apart from a coast guard or 
a navy there might not be any other government institutions 
that can be used to its full capacity for an oil spill 
operation. Without proper institutions in place, the Namibian 
government may find it difficult to find appropriate trainees 
for such purposes. It should be understood that such training 
should be organized and coordinated jointly by the industries
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and the government. The industry could play a major role in 
determining the levels of people to be trained, where to be 
trained and who to coordinate the training program.
Due to the uniqueness of the Namibian situation it is 
suggested that Namibia consider the design of an operational 
training program in line with that of the Canadian model, 
which has particular relevance for Namibia. Although the 
Canadian government structure is different from that of 
Namibia, this program could fit well in Namibia with slight 
alterations.
The proposed operational training courses were 
introduced in Canada as a response to the Review into the 
Tanker Safety in Canada of 1990 and The Nestucca Oil Spill 
Recommendations on training and contingency planning 
exercises. These courses were "felt to satisfying the 
operational response training requirements of a wider range 
of oil spill response personnel throughout the Canadian Coast 
Guard
They are as follows:
(A> Basics of Oil Spill Response,
This course is designed for the following officers': 
fleet system officers and senior crew, designated On-Scene 
Commanders, deputy On-Scene Commanders, ship safety personnel 
(Operational), the district superintendents and emergency 
staff.
The course is designed to provide a basic understanding 
of oil spill response functions, pollution countermeasure 
system and operations sufficient to provide operational 
technical direction for the spill response team in the areas 
of containment, recovery clean-up and disposals.
(B>. Pollution Countermeasures Systems
This course is designed for senior fleet system officers 
and crew, emergency pollution control officers and 
operational staff and all the operational personnel employed 
by the Canadian Coast Guard during an oil spill response. It 
is designed to provide basic operational response of the 
practical level prerequisites for undertaking operational oil 
spills in the four mentioned areas under (A) above.
(C) Spill Site Coordination / Response Management
The course is designated for fleet systems officers, 
deputy on—scene commanders, designated on—scene commanders, 
spill site supervisors and district marine emergency 
officers. The course is designed to provide basic spill site 
co-ordination and supervision training prerequisite for 
undertaking the management of an oil spill response at the 
site level or an on-scene command for response to a small 
spi11.
Although the two systems could not be equated, these 
courses hold considerable potentially for Namibia. Even if 
these courses do exactly fit the Namibias case, Namibia's 
future training program would be well advised to be organized 
along the same lines. It would benefit both the on-scene 
Commander's Team, and the support agencies including the 
private sector. Such training should be organized to minimize 
the duplication of work at the real spills. Trainees should 
be made to understand the interaction of both onshore and 
offshore oil cleanup operations. The plan itself should 
provide for the National Response Team to be involved in 
spill of any size. Instead of monitoring the spill and moving 
in only when local resources become overwhelmed, a national 
response team should work with the local personnel from the
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start of the operation.
Contingency training exercises seem to be a problem for 
many institutions. Without proper institutions in place to 
provide necessary resources in the event of oil spills such 
efforts are useless. Such training exercises should be 
encouraged and provided at all levels of the plan.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
1. It should be noted that this dissertation deals with oil 
pollution prevention of the marine environment in Namibia. 
The first three chapters provided information on the 
country itself, pollution related activities, scientific 
information on oil pollution and the efforts of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in dealing with 
oil pollution of the marine environment.
2. The Namibian marine environment is rich in both living and 
non living resources, i.e fish, oil and gas respectively. 
No doubt the two do not mix; therefore, exploitation of 
the latter should be done in a proper manner allowing the 
sustainability of the other.
3. The issue of environment protection to which marine 
resources is a part has never been a concern of the South 
African colonial administration in Namibia.
4. Apart from the fact that Namibia has never been a maritime 
nation, all its maritime activities including the only deep 
sea port of Walvis Bay are being administered by the South
African administration.
5. All the South African maritime laws have not administered 
in Namibia and none of the international conventions, even 
those to which South Africa is signatory, were not known 
to Namibia.
6. The Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil Act of 1961 amended by the Namibian parliament never 
met international requirements on oil pollution prevention 
and control. The extent to which the provisions of the 
newly passed Namibian laws, such as the Petroleum Act of 
1991 and the Model of Petroleum Agreement are to be 
adhered to will depend on the capabilities of the 
responsible government agency and/or the companies to be 
involved.
7. Although the scope of this paper is on the marine 
environment, and more specifically on oil pollution, other 
issues, such as the need for proper co-ordination of 
environmental activities at state level and safety 
incidents, such as fire extinguishing and life serving at 
sea are noted. The former needs an urgent attention before 
the commencement of the exploitation of oil and gas. The 
latter should always be considered as part of the 
contingency plan at all levels and are all covered in the 
international convections discussed.
8. It should also be noted that the status of Walvis Bay has 
negative impacts on the Namibian law enforcement in the 
area of marine environment protection. Thus,’ there is need 
for a solution to be found on this issue soon.
Recommendations
A. Preventive Measures
1. Having recognized the need for harmonization and 
integration of each of the environmental related 
activities at a national level, a national environmental
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institution with an equal status to that of the National 
Planning Commission should be set up. It could also be an 
independent ministry or a separate department under the 
President or the Prime Minister's offices.
2. In the area of oil pollution, a National Environmental 
Protection Commission (NEPC) should be set-up (as 
discussed in chapter 4. part A: (A). In facilitating its 
work for the formulation of a national oil contingency 
plan, the NEPC should be assisted by a Technical Advisory 
Committee on Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The technical 
committee should consist of the people from the relevant 
ministries, experts from industries and/or learning 
institutions and an on-scene commander who could be an 
independent person appointed according to his experience 
in the field of oil pollution.
3. Although the NEPC should be responsible for the 
formulation and regular review of the plan, the Ministry 
of Works, Transport and Communication should be the lead 
agency for implementing the plan.
4. The Nabibian National Oil Contingency Plan should enable 
the relevant government ministries, national and 
international companies to combine efforts in fighting an 
oil spill if one should occur in the Namibian waters. The 
plan's objectives should be:
- protect the marine resources from harmful effects of oil 
pollution through prevention and control of oil spills;
- increase the readiness level of both personnel and 
equipment when facing oil spills incidents and
- institute an immediate and co-ordinated oil spill 
response system for any oil incident in the Namibian 
waters.
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The plan should cover all the Namibian coastal areas and its 
EEZ. Both prevention, control and combating of all types oil 
spills should be provided in the plan. This should include a 
trans-boundary oil spill, which may require the activation of 
the joint contingency plan if there is any.
5. Since some of the relevant institutions (the Coast Guard 
or the Navy) are not yet in place, the author describes 
only the roles they should play rather than posts. It is 
therefore, up to the government to determine the extent to 
which these functions are to be assigned by particular 
institution (s). The author does belive that the Namibian 
response structure should be made simple whereby all the 
arrangements for the co-operation between different 
institutions and the lead office should be worked out at 
the planning phase. This will enable the on-scene 
commander to control and co-ordinate response effectively. 
The roles of other government and private institutions 
should be clearly stipulated in the plan.
6. For the activation of the plan there should be a national 
response team under one on-scene commander and his staff 
members (as discussed under Chapter 4. B. (D)).
7. The success of oil response depends on proper 
organization, co-ordination and mobilization of the 
resources. All these require some know-how in the field. 
Being non maritime people, Namibians do not have such 
knowledge. Assistance for the attainment of such knowledge 
should be sought at bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels. 
Training under the IMO, UNEP regional Seas and/or through 
the industries' training programs are among many to be 
recommended. The priorities should be given to designated
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members of the On-Scene Commander Team who in turn will be 
able to train their own people at home. The issue of joint 
training and exercise for oil spill response needs full 
trained forces. On this ground the establishment of the 
Namibian Coast Guard or Navy with a specific role of plan 
activation is recommended.
8. To give proper protection to the marine environment 
against oil spills from any source, the state should 
accede to and implement the above discussed conventions in 
this paper (in section 2.4.0 of chapter 2).
9. In order to minimize risk of operational spills during
terminal operations, the government should establish 
strict rules and regulations governing loading and 
unloading operations. These should include and not limited 
to: .
- watch requirements during loading and discharging 
operations to ensure the early detection of spill;
- regular inspections of the hoses and hose couplings by 
government surveyors, (if possible, the flexible hoses 
with higher safety standards should be fixed to the 
piping system at all oil terminals), and
- other alternatives which fit the Namibian conditions 
should be looked into as well.
10. In order to avoid and minimize illegal dumping of oil 
bilge waters and other wastes, regulations should be 
introduced which should:
- require terminals to provide reception facilities to 
recede all ballast, slope and bilge water from all 
tankers docking there;
- require terminals to receive oil containments water 
before allowing them to depart;
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- require inspections to be done on whether all reception 
facilities are being used according to the regulations, 
and
— ensure that reception facility user costs are either 
integrated with other port dues or/and as required by 
the laid procedures.
B. Actual Response
1. In order to deter polluters, the Namibian Coast Guard/Navy 
should be empowered to carry out a continuous, 
co-ordinated and intensive aerial surveillance program all 
over the Namibian waters including its EEZ and oil rigs.
As this requires dedicated surveillance air craft, 
equipped with the latest spill detection and evidence 
gathering technology, joint efforts should be made by all 
those to be involved to ensure their availability. The 
establishment of a shore based satellite along the 
Namibian coast should be considered as this could be used 
for both oil spills and illegal fishing surveillances.
2. Apart from formal information and oil spill reporting 
procedure, which are required to be included in the plan, 
the NEPC in co-operation with other relevant ministries 
should:
— disseminate information on the effects of marine spills 
and spill reporting procedure and
- establish a system whereby people who filed reports 
leading to the conviction of a polluter may be rewarded.
3. While the roles of Customs and Immigration Departments are 
needed to facilitate the entry .into Namibia of oil spill 
control experts and equipment, reporting of oil spill
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whi'ch is likely to affect neighboring states or/and 
requires Joint operation, should be trusted on the 
Dn-Scene Commander Team.
4. While the question of implementing 
plan CWalvis Bay Contingency Plan) 
author feels that the plan could 
future bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
the Southern African region.
I view of the above mentioned I would like to quote some of 
the points given to us by Professor B I Dybern, Director of 
the Swedish Institute of Marine Research which I found 
relevant to this work.
"The sea is the endstatuion and a mirror of life and 
activities from human beings on land, therefore. Scientific 
results are needed for:
* Convince those who pollute
* Convince politicians
* Point out the limits for what the sea can stand and
* Negotiate and co-operate with other countries;
Tliose who have special responsibility are:
* Scientists
* Those who pollute
* Newspaper, radio, TV etc".
the coastal contingency 
remains uncertain, the 
be used as a basis for 
oil spill response of
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Fig. 1
Source; Boixel, Y. Lawof the Sea Lecture Notes (1991) ' •
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Namibia’s basins, other features
I Alil.ii M».5
Summary aj\\j)\‘vls of ait in some major eeosystems^
licosysicin lixpcctcd initial impact ^
1
lixpcctcd recovery
Open, ocean l.t(*,lrt: Impact ort pctapic plarrkton dependent on ciraricc 
event «tf eontaclrng lloattri|; slick. Many otpanisnis rttay 
avoid spill. Sitrlace dwellers may Ire alfccted. Not likely 
that oil would aceirmulatc in o|reii-ucean sediments to 
lethal or sub-lethal levels.
l-'asi: lta|>iil dispersion and degradation of oil. 
lificcitve reproiloclion and dis|>crsal mechanisms (or 
most pelagic organisms.
Outer continental slicIF I.ight-moderatc: Impact on plankton populations light. 
Itnpacl on spawnitt|> popirlations of Itsh larvae severe. 
Aloilerate impact on irerrthic systems if oil reaches 
hot lorn.
i'asi- niodcrnle: Fast recovery for plankttrn bec:iuse of 
rapid regeneration limes. Ntoderale recovery of 
Irettihic systems if oil reaches botiuin.
Open estuarine areas, 
bays, channels and 
liathouis
Moderate heavy: Chrortie oil ntay depress pt>|Hrlatioris 
of fish amt some tientlios; or induce changes in species 
aburtdance anti ttistriliiilritn. Spilled-oil ellccts 
dcperulent on time tif year (spawning; migration, etc.) 
and oil’s persistence.
I'asi slow: Dependent ort flushing characteristics, 
route to lienihos, shoreline characteristics, and 
community stability. Imlividoal year classes of larval 
fauna may lie severely atlcclcd.
Wetlands, inarslies and 
iiiangtovcs
lleavy.'^Prttcntial serious threat as result of vulnerability 
to spills and sigriiticancc of estuarine functions (nursery 
and breeding grmiruls; high prorluctivity). 1‘aunal 
mortalities leading tir decreases itt population ilcnsity, 
changes in s|rccies abitmlance amt ilisltibuliim. Damage 
trr niarslt grasses alter repealed exposirte and decrease in 
ptoditclivily. Damage to mangroves and neighbouring 
grasses.
Moilerale slow: Persistence of oil in sediments 
prolongs toxicity. Once oil is removed, biological 
succession may lie moderate in some areas, since 
organisms generally reproduce and disperse fairly 
rapidly. Mangrove swamps particularly, complex and 
may lake long to recover. Marsh areas may be 
alfecled for many years.
Coral reefs Unknown: Some reports of lethal and .sub-lethal 
damage.
Unknown: Recovery could be slow liecausc of 
sirirctural complexity of coral communities.
Polar ecosyslenis Unknown: Smne reports of elfccis on arctic lakes and 
on individual ttrgattisms
Unknown: Recovery could be slow since spilled oil 
may persist longer at colder tem|K'ratures and since 
polar organisms have slower growth rates, extended 
life cycles, longer reproductive periodicity, and 
narrower-ranging dispersal stages. However, recovery 
may be more rapid liccausc organisms have already 
adapted to harsh conditions.
*A(l:t|>U'il lioiii li)l:iiul aiitl ScliiicidcT (1976).
Source: Polltion scientific Background to the Global conventions (MARPOL & L.D).
Taiilu 50.6
Summary of proposed enviroumvutal ctasijjicotum in order of hureasinf* vidnerability to oil spill damaye \
Vulnerahilily
imiex Sliorclinc type Comments
1 Hxposeil rocky heaillands Wave rcilcctioii keeps most of the oil oll'shorc. No cican-up is necessary.
2 l-roding wave'Ciil plairorins Wave swept. Most oil removed by natural processes within weeks.
3 I'inc-graincd sand Iwadics Oil docs not penetrate into the sediment, facilitating incchanicul removal if 
necessary. Ollierwisc. oil may |>ersist several nionllis.
4 Coarse-grained sand lieaclics Oil may sink an<l/or be buried rapidly making clean-up dinicult. Under moderate 
to low energy conditions, oil will be removed naturally within months from most 
of the Ireacliface.
5 Hxposed. compacted tidal Oats Most oil will not adhere to, nor penetrate into, the compacted tidal fait. Clean-up 
is usually unnecessary.
6 Mixed sand and gravel licaclies Oil may iimlergo rapid penetration and burial. Under moderate to low energy 
comlitioiis, oil may persist for years.
7 Gravel beaches Same as above. Clean-up should concentrate on the high-tide swash area. A solid 
asphalt pavement may form under heavy oil accumulations.
8 Sheltered rocky coasts Areas of reduced wave action. Oil may persist fur many years. CIcan-up is not 
rccoinmcnded unless oil concentration is very heavy.
9 Sheltered tidal Oats Areas of great biologic activity and low wave energy. Oil may persist for years. 
Clean-up is nut recommended unless oil accumulation is very heavy. I'hese areas 
should receive piiority protection by using booms or soil sorbent materials.
10 Salt marshes and mangroves Most productive of aquatic environments. Oil may persist for years. Cleaning of 
salt marshes by burning or cutting should be undertaken only if heavily oiled. 
Mangroves should not be altered. Protection of these environments by bourns or 
sorbent material should receive first priority.
After Gmidlacli anti Hayes (1978).
Source: Pollution Scientific Background to the
Global Conventions (MARPOL & L.D)
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Figure 5.4 The Port of Luderitz
Source: SIDA, Transport and Communications 
in Namibia

SCHEDULE III
From IMO Resolution A.542(13)
ITEMIZED LIST OF POSSIBLE EVIDENCE ON ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION 
OF THE MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX I DISCHARGE PROVISIONS
1 ACTION ON SIGHTING OIL POLLUTION
1.1 Particulars of ship or ships suspected of contravention
1.1.1 Name of ship
1.1.2 Reasons for suspecting the ship
1.1.3 Date and time (GMT] of observation or identification
1.1.4 Position of ship
1.1.5 Flag and port of registry
1.1.6 Type (e.g. tanker, cargo ship, passenger ship, fishing vessel), size 
(estimated tonnage) and other descriptive data (e .g. superstmcture colour 
and funnel mark)
1.1.7 Draught condition (loaded or in ballast)
1.1.8 Approximate course and speed
1.1.9 Position of slick in relation to ship (e.g. astern, port, starboard)
1.1.10 Part of the ship from which discharge was seen emanating
1.1.11 Whether discharge ceased when ship was observed or contacted by radio
1.2 Particulars of slick
1.2.1 Date and time (GMT) of observation if different from 1.1.3
1.2.2 Position of oil slick in longitude and latitude if different from 1.1.4
1.2.3 Approximate distance in nautical miles from the nearest landmark
1.2.4 Approximate overall dimension of oil slick (length! width and percentage 
thereof covered by oil)
1.2.5 Physical description of oil slick (direction and form, e.g. continuous, in 
patches or in windrows)
Source; Canadian vi:: Pollution Prevention Offi 
Manual
1.2.6 Appearance ol oil slick (indicate categories)
Caieaorv A Barely visitjle under most favourable light condition
Category B Visible as silvery sheen on water surface
Category C. First trace ol colour may be observed
Category D: Bright band ol colour
Category E. Colours begin to turn dull
Category F; Colours are much darker
1.2.7 Sky conditions (bright sunshine, overcast, etc.), lightlaD and visibility 
ikiiometres) at the time ol observation
1.2.8 Sea stale
1.2.9 Direction and speed ol surface wind
1.2.10 Direction and speed ol current
1.3 Identification of the observer(s)
1.3.1 Name ol the observer
1.3.2 Organization with which observer is affiliated (if any)
1.3.3 Observer's status within the organization
1.3.4 Observation made from aircrali/ship/shore/othenrvise
13.5 Name or identity ol ship or aircraft from which the observation was made
1.3.6 Specific location of ship, aircraft, place on shore or otherwise from which 
observation was'made
1.3.7 Activity engaged in by observer when observation was made, for 
example: patrol, voyage flight (en route from .... to ....), etc.
1.4 Method of observation and documentation
1.4.1 Visual
1.4.2 Conventional photographs
1.4.3 Remote sensing records and/or remote sensing photographs
1.4.4 Samples taken from slick
1.4.5 Any other form ol observation (specify)
Note: A photograph of the discharge should preferably be in colour.
Photographs can provide the following information, that a material 6n 
the sea surface/s oil. that the quantity of oil discharged does constitute 
a violation of the Convention, that the oil is beinn. o. iias been discharged 
from a particular ship, the identity of the ship. ■
Experience has shown that the aloremennoned can be obtained with 
the lollowing three photographs;
. 1 details of the slick taken almost vertically down from an altitude 
of less than 300 m with the sun behind the photographer;
.2 an overall view of the ship and "slick" showing oil emanating 
from a particular ship;
.3 details of the ship for the purpose of identification.
1.5 Other information if radio contact can be established
1.5.1 Master informed of pollution
1.5.2 Explanation of master
1.5.3 Ship's last port of call
1.5.4 Ship's next port of call
1.5.5 Name of ship's master and owner
1.5.6 Ship's call sign
2 INVESTIGATION ON BOARD
2.1 Inspection of lOPP Certificate
2.1.1 Name of ship
2.1.2 Distinctive number or letters
2.1.3 Port of registry
2.1.4 Type of ship
2.1J5 Date and place of issue
2.1.6 Date and place of endorsement
Note: If the ship is not issued with an lOPP Certificate as much as possible
of the repuested information should be given.
2.2 Inspection of supplement of the lOPP Certificate
2.2.1 Applicable paragraphs of sections 2. 3. 4. 5 and 6 of the supplement 
(non-oil tankersl
2.2.2
Note:
Applicable paragraphs of sections 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the 
supplement (oil tankers)
the ship does not have an lOPP Certificate, a description should be 
iven of the equipment and arrangements on board, designed to prevent 
larine pollution.
2 3 Inspection of Oil Record Book (O.R.B)
2.3.1 Copy Sufficient pages of the O.R.B. - Part 1 to cover a period of 30 days 
prior to the reponed incident.
2.3.2 Copy sufficient pages of the O.R.B. - Part II (if on board) to cover a full 
loadino.'unloading/pallasting and tank cleaning cycle of the ship. Also 
copy the tank diagram.
2.4 Inspection of the log-book
2.4.1 Last port, date of departure, draught forward and aft
2.4.2 Current port, date of arrival, draught fonrvard and aft
2.4.3 Ship’s position at or near the time tfie incident was reported
2.4.4 Spot check if positions mentioned in the log-book agree with positions 
noted in the O.R.B.
2.5 Inspection of other documentation on board
2.5. f Other documentation relevant for evidence lif necessary make copies) 
such as:
• — recent ullage sheets
— records of monitoring and control equipment
2.6 Inspection of ship
2,6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.6.5
Ship's equipment in accordance with the supplement of the lOPP 
Certificate
Samples taken. State location on board
Tiacos of Oil in vicinity of overboard discharge outlets
Condition of engine-room and contents of bilges
Condition of o'lly-water separator, filtering equipment and alarm, stopping 
or monitoring arrangements
2.6.6 Contents of sludge and/or holding tanks
2.6..7 Sources of considerable leakage
On oil tankers the following additional evidence may be pertinent:
2.6.8 Oil on Surface of segregated or dedicated clean ballast
2.6.9 Condition of pump-room bilges
2.6.10 Condition of COW system
2.6.11 Condition of IG system
2.6.12 Condition of monitoring and control system
2.6.13 Slop tank contents (estimate quantity of water and of oil)
2.7 Statements of persons concerned
If the O.R.B. - Part I has not been properly completed, kiformation on the following
questions may be pertinent;
2.7.1 Was there a discharge (accidental or intentional) at the time indicated 
on the incident report?
2.7.2 Is the bilge discharge controlled automatically?
2.7.3 If so. at what time was the system last put into operation and at what 
time was the system last put on manual mode?
2.7.4 If not. what were date and time of the last bilge discharge?
2.7.5 What was the date of the last disposal of residue and how was disposal 
effected?
2.7.6 Is it usual to effect discharge of bilge water directly to the sea, or to store 
bilge water first in a collecting tank? identify the collecting tank.
2.7.7 - Have oil fuel tanks recently been used as ballast tanks?
If the O.R.B. 'i- Part II has not been property completed information on the following
questions may be pe,rtinent:
2:7.8 What was the cargo/ballast distribution in the ship on departure from 
the last port?
2.7.9 What was the cargo/balast distribution in the ship on arrival in the current 
port?
2.7.10 When and yvhere was the last loading effected?
2.7.11 When and where was the last unloading effected?
2.7.12 When and where was the last discharge of dirty ballast?
2.7.13 When and where was the last cleaning of cargo tanks?
2.7.14 When and where was the last COW operation and which tanks were
washed?
2.7.15 When and where was the last decanting of slop tanks?
2.7.16 What is the ullage in ttie slop tanks and the corresponding height of 
interface?
2.7.17 Which tanks contained the dirty ballast during the ballast voyage (if ship 
arrived in ballast)?
2.7.18 Which tanks contained the clean ballast during the ballast voyage (if ship 
arrived in ballast)?
